Case of violation of the 1936 Montreux Convention. Turkey called on Russia to remove the issue of violation of the Montreux Convention from the agenda. Prerequisites for concluding a new agreement

Adopted at the Conference on the regime of the Black Sea Straits, held June 22 - July 21, 1936 in Montreux (Switzerland). At the same time, Türkiye pledged to comply with the principles of international maritime law.

Story

The conference on the regime of the Black Sea Straits was held from June 22 to July 21, 1936 in Montreux (Switzerland) with the participation of the USSR, Turkey, Great Britain, France, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Australia and Japan. The conference was convened at the proposal of Turkey in order to revise the convention on the regime of the Black Sea Straits, adopted at the Lausanne Conference of 1922-23. Italy refused to participate in the conference because the participating countries supported international sanctions against Italy due to the situation in Ethiopia. At the conference in Montreux, Great Britain made a proposal to equalize the rights of the Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers to the passage of their warships through the straits, which would lead to restriction of the rights of passage of ships of the USSR Navy. Ultimately, the conference was not disrupted and led to the development of agreed decisions. On July 20, the participating countries signed a new convention on the regime of the straits, on the basis of which Turkey received the right to remilitarize the straits zone.

Main provisions of the convention

The Montreux Convention preserves the freedom of merchant ships of all countries to pass through the straits in both peace and war. However, the regime for the passage of warships is different in relation to Black Sea and non-Black Sea states. Subject to prior notification to the Turkish authorities, the Black Sea powers can conduct their warships of any class through the straits in peacetime. For warships of non-Black Sea powers, significant restrictions have been introduced in terms of class (only small surface ships can pass) and tonnage. The total tonnage of military vessels of non-Black Sea states in the Black Sea should not exceed 30 thousand tons (with the possibility of increasing this maximum to 45 thousand tons in the event of an increase in the naval forces of the Black Sea countries) with a stay of no more than 21 days. In the event of Turkey's participation in the war, and also if Turkey considers that it is directly threatened by war, it is given the right to permit or prohibit the passage of any military vessels through the straits. During a war in which Turkey is not involved, the straits must be closed to the passage of warships of any belligerent power. The Convention abolished the international commission on the straits provided for by the Lausanne Convention and transferred its functions to the Turkish government.

Black Sea powers (Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, USSR until 1991, Russia since 1991, Ukraine since 1991, Georgia since 1991)

Meaning of the convention

The decisions adopted at the conference in Montreux became for their time a step forward towards recognizing the rights of the Black Sea countries in the issue of the status of the straits. Italy joined the Montreux Convention in 1938.

Question about the passage of aircraft carriers

One of the controversial issues regarding the convention is the possibility of aircraft carriers passing through the straits. Article 10 stipulates:

In time of peace, light surface ships, small warships and auxiliaries, whether they belong to the Powers littoral to the Black Sea or not, whatever their flag, will enjoy the right of freedom of passage through the Straits, without any fees or charges, insofar as they enter there during the day and under the conditions provided for in Articles 13 and following below. Warships other than those falling within the classes specified in the previous paragraph will have the right of passage only under the special conditions provided for in Articles 11 and 12.

At the same time, Article 11 stipulates the right of passage for battleships, Article 12 - the rule for the passage of submarines. Appendix II, paragraph B of the convention defines the classes of battleships, light warships, small combat and auxiliary vessels, submarines and, separately, aircraft carriers:

Aircraft carriers are surface warships which, whatever their displacement, are designed or constructed primarily for the transport and deployment of aircraft at sea. If a warship was not intended or designed primarily for the transportation and commissioning of aircraft at sea, then the installation of a deck for launching or takeoff on this ship will not have the consequence of including it (the ship) in the class of aircraft carriers.

Thus, formally, aircraft carriers do not have the right of passage through the straits, since Article 10 stipulates the conditions of passage only for light surface, small and auxiliary ships, and specifically stipulates that besides them only battleships (Article 11) and submarines (Article 12) have the right of passage ). Aircraft carriers find themselves de facto excluded from the number of ships entitled to pass through the straits. The exception is the situation in which Turkey is a belligerent or considers itself to be under a direct military threat - in this case, according to Articles 20 and 21, Turkey has the right to regulate the passage of ships at its discretion.

Despite the formal absence of rules for the passage of aircraft carriers through the straits, the USSR did not experience significant difficulties with the deployment of its aircraft-carrying cruisers, which were built in Nikolaev, through the straits. It is periodically suggested that the presence of powerful strike weapons on Soviet aircraft-carrying ships was connected precisely with the desire to avoid the formal classification of these ships as aircraft carriers - that is, intended or arranged primarily for the carriage and commissioning at sea of aircraft.

Significant cases in the context of the convention with the USA

However, it should be noted that according to Article 21:

In the event that Turkey considers itself to be under immediate military danger, it will have the right to apply the provisions of Article 20 of this Convention. If the Turkish Government takes advantage of the opportunities provided to it by the first paragraph above, it will notify the High Contracting Parties thereof, as well as the Secretary General of the League of Nations. If the Council of the League of Nations, by a two-thirds majority, decides that the measures thus taken by Turkey are not justified, and if such is also the opinion of the majority of the High Contracting Parties signatory to this Convention, then the Turkish Government undertakes to repeal those measures, as well as those would be adopted by virtue of Article 6 of this Convention.

In view of the dissolution of the League of Nations, the right to apply Article 20 -

"We will not allow anyone, including the United States, to violate the Montreux Convention. It is too important for the stability of the Black Sea region and the security of Istanbul and the straits,” said Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu during his visit to Japan on April 13.

A little earlier, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov criticized Turkey for violating the convention when Turkey allowed US Navy ships to stay in the Black Sea for more than 21 days. Although Lavrov's statements were officially denied by Ankara, Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrei Karlov repeated them during a conference last week, based on recommendations from the Russian Foreign Ministry.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry officially stated in response: “We are puzzled by the persistent attempts of the Russian Federation to keep negotiations on the Montreux Convention on the agenda. Russia stated that the US Navy ship USS Taylor was in the Black Sea for more than 21 days, but the Turkish Foreign Ministry recalls that the aforementioned ship was stuck in port due to damage to the propeller that occurred upon entering the port of Samsun. When attempts at repair did not yield any result, the ship was towed outside of both the Black Sea and the straits."

The claim that the Montreux Convention was violated by the time spent trying to repair a damaged ship that was in port and unable to move is incomprehensible."

Also, the Turkish Foreign Ministry notified the Russian Foreign Ministry in writing that “... the second US ship, USS Truxtun, left the Black Sea within 21 days and there was no violation at all.”

USS Truxtun (DDG 103) in the Mediterranean Sea

Recalling that the Black Sea region is experiencing a moment of crisis due to the Ukrainian events, Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu admitted that “...from time to time, at such moments, disagreements with Russia are inevitable.

However, for the last 78 years, Turkey has been faithfully implementing the Montreux Convention, which has made a significant contribution to the security of the Black Sea countries. We believe that discussing minor technical provisions of the Convention through the media does not benefit anyone.

On the other hand, it is wonderful that we have the opportunity to resolve disagreements with Russia through dialogue. We will sit down and discuss all our differences. Turkey will continue to implement the Montreux Convention carefully, as it has always done," he said.

Meanwhile, yesterday, four Turkish F-16s flew out to intercept a Russian Il-20M reconnaissance aircraft, which walked for several tens of kilometers parallel to the Turkish maritime border, from the Black Sea, but without crossing it, inspecting the Turkish coast and ports with its surveillance equipment

Probably, the Il-20M monitored the lack of military activity in the Turkish Black Sea ports, as well as the possible presence of US and French submarines in this region.

A source in the Turkish Armed Forces said that: "...we are not offended. Trust, but verify, as they say in Russia."

NATO countries ignore the Black Sea Straits Treaty

Recently, the third US warship, the destroyer Donald Cook, and the French military intelligence ship Dupuy de Lome entered the Black Sea through the Turkish Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. Shortly before this, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced a violation by Turkey and the United States of the international Montreux Convention (1936), regulating the period of presence and tonnage of foreign military vessels in the Black Sea basin. But the American and Turkish sides ignore Moscow’s position. The West is clearly demonstrating military force in connection with the situation in Ukraine and the reunification of Crimea with Russia.

The famous Turkish political scientist Fatih Er actually confirmed that these (NATO) “invasions” are addressed primarily to Russia.

In view of the increasingly frequent “visits” of NATO warships to the Black Sea, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that “the extension of the stay of US Navy ships in the Black Sea has often exceeded the time limits established by the International Montreux Convention.”

S. Lavrov clarified: “According to the Montreux Convention on the Status of the Straits, warships of countries that do not have access to the Black Sea can stay in its waters for no more than 21 days, and significant restrictions on the class and tonnage of the vessel have been introduced for them.”

According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, “the US Navy frigate USS Taylor entered the Black Sea on February 5 and left for the Mediterranean Sea on March 9 of this year, which exceeded the maximum permissible period by 11 days and, accordingly, is a violation of the Convention. At the same time, the Turkish side did not inform us about this delay in a timely manner. For our part, our concerns have been brought to the attention of the American and Turkish sides in the form of verbal notes.”

Let us recall that since Russia’s access to the Black Sea and the expansion of its Black Sea territories, ensuring their security has always rested on Turkish policy on issues of military shipping through the Dardanelles - the Sea of Marmara - the Bosporus.

Russian proposals to ban military vessels from non-Black Sea countries from entering this artery between the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean have always been rejected by the European powers and Turkey, and after the First World War by the United States.

For example, the Crimean War (1853-1856) of the Western coalition against Russia became possible thanks to the free access of European naval forces through the same straits. During the Entente intervention in Russia in 1918-1919. The Western fleet also passed unhindered through these straits not only to the Black Sea, but also to the Azov and Danube ports of Russia. It is also worth recalling that Russia’s allies categorically objected to Russian naval operations in the Bosporus and the Sea of Marmara during the First World War, which would have quickly taken Turkey out of the war.

In 1915, the Entente wanted to capture Constantinople and thereby close the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmara from Russia, but in vain! It was the unsuccessful Gallipoli operation of 1915, carried out without the participation of Russian troops. However, during the previous Russian-Turkish wars, the European powers threatened Russia with an almost collective invasion of its territory if Russian troops “dare” to enter Constantinople and take possession of the Bosphorus. But the long-term and numerous bloody battles of the troops of Russia and Turkey in the Balkans and in the Eastern Turkish mountains, including in 1914-1917, did not cause discontent among the powers of Europe: let more Russians and Turks kill each other. And although after 1918 until the mid-1930s there was a warming in Soviet-Turkish relations, Ankara did not agree with Moscow’s proposal for the indefinite demilitarization of the straits and for bilateral Soviet-Turkish military provision of their security.

Under pressure from London, Paris and Washington, on July 24, 1923, an international Convention on the Regime of the Straits was signed in Lausanne (Switzerland). It was signed by Great Britain, France, the USSR, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Turkey. The convention provided for the demilitarization of the straits zone, but allowed free passage through the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles not only for commercial and passenger ships, but also for military ships of any country. Therefore, the USSR did not ratify the Convention. As follows from the statement of the Soviet People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, "... due to the lack of proper security conditions for the straits, the Black Sea basin as a whole and, accordingly, the southern borders of the USSR." Subsequently, the Soviet side was able to achieve a partial revision of the regime for the straits.

In the Swiss city of Montreux, on July 21, 1936, the Convention on the Status of the Straits, which is still in force today, was signed. It was signed and ratified by the USSR, Turkey, Great Britain, France, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Japan.

The document preserves the freedom of passage through the straits for merchant ships of all countries in times of peace and war. But the regime for the passage of warships is different for Black Sea and non-Black Sea states. With prior notification to the Turkish authorities, the Black Sea countries can conduct their warships of any class in peacetime. And for military ships of non-Black Sea states, restrictions on class and tonnage have been introduced. Only small and auxiliary surface ships can pass here, and the total tonnage of military ships of non-Black Sea countries in the Black Sea should not exceed 30 thousand tons, although this volume can be increased to 45 thousand tons if the Black Sea countries increase their navies in the region. The stay of “non-Black Sea” military vessels was limited to 21 days (Moscow insisted on 14 days, but the British achieved more).

As for Turkey's policy in the straits, the Convention introduced the following rules: in the event of Turkey's participation in the war, and if Turkey considers that it is threatened by war, the Turkish side is given the right to permit/prohibit the passage of military ships of any countries through the straits. And during a war in which Turkey is not participating, the straits are closed to the passage of military ships of any belligerent power.

In addition, the Montreux Convention abolished the international commission on the straits established by the Lausanne Convention; its functions, and with them sovereignty in this region, were transferred to Turkey.

But during the Great Patriotic War, the Turkish straits were used by Germany and its allies for operations against the USSR. In an effort to smooth out such a hostile policy along the straits, Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan at the end of February 1945. And from mid-April 1945, it allowed the delivery of allied cargo to Soviet ports through the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosporus. The total volume of these supplies to the Black Sea ports of the USSR in 1945 amounted to 681 thousand tons, which approximately corresponds to 5% of all allied supplies to the USSR. Over 300 thousand tons arrived in Batumi, up to 100 thousand tons - in Poti, the rest of the cargo was received by the ports of Sukhumi and Tuapse. However, on March 19, 1945, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Turkish Treaty “On Friendship and Neutrality” (December 1925).

And then, on June 7, 1945, V.M. Molotov told the Turkish Ambassador to the USSR S. Sarper that “the desirable conditions for concluding a new agreement are a regime of exclusive Soviet-Turkish control in the Black Sea straits and their demilitarization. With the placement of a Soviet naval base in this area under a long-term lease” (similar to the Soviet bases of Porkkalla-Udd in Finland or Dalny in China in 1945-1955). But Ankara rejected these projects.

At the beginning of the Potsdam Conference, Molotov repeated these proposals, adding that “...we have repeatedly stated to our allies that the USSR cannot consider the Montreux Convention correct.”

Then the problem was discussed with the participation of Stalin himself, who refuted the thesis about the threat to Turkey from the USSR. Noting that “the Turks in the Constantinople area have over 20 divisions, perhaps 23 or 24 divisions. And, owning the Straits, a small state, supported by England, holds a large state by the throat and does not allow it passage.”

Great Britain and the United States vigorously stood up for Turkey and the Montreux Convention. But under pressure from the USSR, and taking into account the pro-Soviet position on this issue of Greece, which is close to the straits, in section XVI “Black Sea Straits” of the final protocol of the conference it was said: “The Convention on the Straits concluded in Montreux should be revised as not meeting the conditions of the present time. We agreed that as a next step, this issue will be the topic of direct negotiations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government.”

But Moscow decided to put pressure on Ankara on its own. On August 7, 1946, the USSR government issued a note in which the above-mentioned demands were repeated. However, this time the United States and Great Britain expressed unequivocal support for Turkey. Already in the late 1940s, US military and intelligence bases appeared in Turkey, including in some of its Black Sea regions, and in February 1952, Turkey and Greece joined NATO. Thus, the navies of NATO countries in the Black Sea received carte blanche. Moreover, the Montreux Convention, we repeat, does not prohibit the presence of “non-Black Sea” navies in this basin.

And on May 30, 1953, the Soviet government officially abandoned Stalin’s demands, and subsequently the USSR never raised the issue of the regime of the straits. Even during the Cuban missile crisis (October 1962). Moscow was afraid of putting pressure on Ankara again, which could provoke an increase in the military presence of the United States and, in general, NATO in the Black Sea region. At the same time, according to available data, NATO, including Turkey, in the 1960s - 1980s. violated the military terms of the Montreux Convention at least 30 times. There is a version that NATO naval intelligence had a hand - again through the straits - in the destruction of the battleship Novorossiysk in 1955 near Sevastopol...

During the preparation and holding of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (early-mid 1970s), the USA, Great Britain and Turkey made it clear that they were not inclined to change anything in the Convention and that returning to this issue could delay the signing of the final Act . Moscow chose not to extend these deadlines. And in 1991-1992. The Russian Federation, Ukraine and Georgia joined the Convention instead of the USSR.

Today it is obvious that the Montreux Convention, while retaining the possibilities for direct and indirect military-political provocations against Russia, is quite suitable for the West.

Moreover, given the current openly hostile relations of the Kyiv junta towards Russia, as was the case, say, during the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008. Therefore, it is hardly possible for the signatory countries of the Montreux Convention to create, for example, a commission to verify the implementation of all the rules of this document or to clarify them.

By the way, in the second half of the 1940s and early 1950s, the USSR repeatedly proposed creating such a commission. The idea was supported by Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Greece. Western countries and Türkiye did not respond to such proposals. But if the provisions of this Convention can be violated even by non-Black Sea countries, and without consequences, then Russia will have to look for symmetrical answers. And no longer appeal to the Montreux Convention, which is not respected by other signatory countries located, note, distant lands from the Black Sea...

Special for the Centenary

The small Swiss town of Montreux entered the history of international relations 80 years ago, in the summer of 1936, when one of the key issues of European politics, which had long been the cause of many conflicts, was resolved here - the issue of the Black Sea Straits.

View of Montreux

Located on the picturesque shores of Lake Geneva, Montreux became a favorite holiday destination for Russian writers and composers at the end of the 19th century. We came here Pyotr Tchaikovsky And Lev Tolstoy. He spent the last years of his life, from 1960 to 1977, in Montreux Vladimir Nabokov- and was buried there. But the whole world started talking about this town in 1936...

"From the Varangians to the Greeks"

The question of the Black Sea acquired significance for the Eastern Slavs in the early period of the development of Russian statehood. Already in the prince's treaty Oleg with the Byzantines, concluded in 907, it was about the terms of trade on the Black Sea: Russian merchants were granted a number of privileges, they were exempt from paying duties to Constantinople. At that time, there was a route “from the Varangians to the Greeks,” connecting Northern Europe with Southern Europe, Scandinavia with the Byzantine Empire. In fact, Ancient Rus' controlled this entire route from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The importance of the route “from the Varangians to the Greeks” began to decline at the beginning of the 13th century, not least because of the sack of the capital of Byzantium by the crusaders in 1204. In addition, a difficult era of feudal fragmentation in Rus' began.

Interest in the Black Sea was renewed after the unification of the Russian principalities around Moscow. There were several reasons for this, and first of all, the existence of a constant threat from the south, from the Crimean Khanate, which regularly raided Russian lands for the purpose of robbery and capturing slaves (the fight against it would last for more than one century). The concept of “Moscow – the Third Rome” was also important, according to which Rus' claimed succession from Byzantium, which became the ideological justification for the desire to take control of Constantinople. However, the straits as such had not yet acquired paramount importance at that time.

Everything changed with the conclusion of the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace in 1774, which ended the next Russian-Turkish war. According to the peace treaty, Russia received not only full access to the Black Sea, but also the right to have its own military fleet on it, as well as the possibility of free passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Russian merchant ships were given equal rights with English and French ones. From this time on, Russia began not only to conquer the Black Sea lands from Turkey, which was previously the absolute owner of the Black Sea (in fact, it was its internal sea), but also to defend its interests in the straits zone on an equal basis with the European powers.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk - first president of Turkey

At the same time, the famous “Greek Project” appeared. Catherine II, according to which Byzantium, led by the grandson of the empress, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, was to be recreated on the lands of the Balkan Peninsula liberated from the Turks. In 1787, during a visit to Crimea, Catherine II ordered the gates of the Sevastopol fortress under construction to be decorated with the inscription: “Road to Constantinople.” It was an unambiguous manifesto of the new Eastern policy of the Russian Empire.

It would, however, be wrong to say that Russian-Turkish relations on the issue of the Black Sea Straits were limited solely to confrontation - Russian diplomacy made a number of unsuccessful attempts to conclude a military-political agreement with the Turks. So, in 1799, during the Napoleonic Wars, Russia, being a member of the anti-French coalition, moved towards rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire. The latter, we note, rather needed this, since it turned out to be unable to independently protect the straits due to the significant losses it suffered in the confrontation with Napoleon in Egypt. According to the agreement, the Turks recognized Russia's special rights in the Black Sea and granted the right of unhindered passage through the straits to its merchant and military ships. True, the vector of Russian foreign policy soon changed again: due to the reorientation of St. Petersburg towards an alliance with Napoleon, marked by the conclusion of the Peace of Tilsit, the alliance with the Ottoman Empire did not last long.

G.V. Chicherin - People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR (then USSR) from 1918 to 1930

In 1806, a new Russian-Turkish war began, which brought Russia privileges regarding the use of the straits in accordance with the Bucharest Peace Treaty signed in 1812. The next war, 1828–1829, ended with the Peace of Adrianople, which was also beneficial for Russia. And in 1833, in the town of Unkar Iskelesi near Istanbul, an agreement was signed between the Russian and Ottoman empires, formalizing their military alliance. Among other things, it provided that in the event of an attack on Russia by a third party, the Sultan was obliged to close the straits to any foreign military vessels, thereby guaranteeing the security of Russia's southern borders. As for the idea of conquering Constantinople, Emperor Nicholas I abandoned it at that time, believing that Russia would benefit from a weak Turkey rather than its division.

However, this alliance did not last long: the traditional contradictions between the two powers turned out to be stronger. The dissatisfaction of Great Britain and France, the biggest losers from the Unkar-Iskelesi Treaty, also played a role. In 1841, after its expiration, the London Convention on the Straits was concluded, which was much more in line with English interests than Russian ones. The security of Russia's southern borders was no longer guaranteed at all, since the Sultan could open the straits to foreign allies in the event of a military conflict.

This is exactly what happened during the Crimean War, the result of which for the Russian and Ottoman empires, in particular, was a ban on having a naval fleet in the Black Sea (primarily this hit Russia, since Turkey retained the right to maintain naval forces in neighboring Mramornaya and Mediterranean seas). Another result of this war was the closure of the straits to military ships in peacetime. Russia will restore the Black Sea Fleet, having received the corresponding right in 1871, but the issue of the straits will remain acute for several more decades.

KINYAPINA N.S. The Balkans and Straits in Russian foreign policy at the end of the 19th century (1878–1898). M., 1994;
***
IGNATIEV A.V., Nezhinsky L.N. and others. Russia and the Black Sea Straits (XVIII–XX centuries) / M., 1999.

Long road to compromise

Defeat in the First World War brought Turkey to the brink of extinction as an independent state. In 1920, she was forced to conclude the Treaty of Sèvres with her Entente allies (among whom Russia, which was shaken by the Civil War at that time), on extremely unfavorable terms. Almost the entire territory of the former Ottoman Empire was subject to division, the size of the Turkish army was strictly limited, a foreign protectorate was actually established over the country, but most importantly, Constantinople and the straits were declared an international demilitarized zone, the management of which was entrusted to the great powers. Thus, it was intended to put an end to the issue of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, excluding any participation of Turkey in deciding their fate.

However, the Treaty of Sèvres was not even ratified by the Turkish government: indignation at its terms reached such a limit in the country that the civil war that had begun in it flared up in full force. The official Sultan's government was opposed by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (that's what the Turkish parliament is still called today), led by General Mustafa Kemal, disagreeing with the terms of peace with the Entente. By the way, he received considerable support from Soviet Russia, which was one of the first in the world to recognize the Kemal government in Ankara, provided the rebels with weapons, ammunition, shells and gold, and under the Moscow Treaty of 1921, also transferred the territory of the Kars region. In the fall of 1922, it became clear that Kemal's troops were winning. The Entente signed an armistice that stopped hostilities and canceled a number of points of the Treaty of Sèvres until a new agreement was concluded. Soon the Sultan Mehmed VI left the country, and Türkiye finally became a republic.

V.V. Vorovsky, a member of the Soviet delegation at the Lausanne Conference, was killed in Lausanne by the former White Guard officer M. Conradi

However, the urgency of the issue of the straits remained - the need for a full-fledged peace treaty was obvious. A conference specially convened to prepare such a treaty was held in Lausanne from November 20, 1922 to July 24, 1923. Its participants were Turkey, Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Romania, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (future Yugoslavia), Japan and the USA. Representatives of Bulgaria and the RSFSR were also invited to the conference, but their participation, according to the decision of the Entente countries, was limited exclusively to the issue of the straits. Despite the declared protest against such discrimination, the Soviet delegation led by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin nevertheless took part in the conference.

MM. Litvinov - People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR from 1930 to 1939

The position of the RSFSR was to defend the territorial integrity of Turkey in accordance with the Moscow Treaty, as well as to support the Turkish government in protest against the regime of capitulations and a request for the cancellation of the country's external debts. As for the Bosporus and Dardanelles, representatives of the RSFSR advocated their complete opening to merchant ships of all countries and complete closure to military, armed ships and military aircraft of all states, with the exception of Turkey itself. Thus, the Soviet side was almost the only ally of Turkey at the Lausanne Conference.

This option did not suit the Western powers, and while practically no contradictions arose during the discussion regarding merchant shipping, it was difficult for the conference participants to reach agreement on the issue of military vessels in the straits. In particular, Great Britain demanded international control over the straits and their complete demilitarization (destruction of coastal fortifications), seeking to preserve the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres. Other powers (primarily France) advocated a softer option: the passage of military ships of any country was declared free in peacetime, and in wartime - subject to Turkey's neutrality (in the event of its participation in the war, free passage was allowed only to ships of neutral states).

The contradictions turned out to be so acute that in February 1923 it was decided to temporarily interrupt the conference. The Soviet side was not officially informed about the resumption of its work at the end of April, so our representatives arrived in Switzerland late. The situation became even more complicated on May 10, when there, in Lausanne, a former White Guard officer Maurice Conradi one of the members of the Soviet delegation was killed Vaclav Vorovsky. At the last stage of the conference, the participation of the Soviet side was seriously limited.

The result of long negotiations was the Lausanne Peace Treaty, which for Turkey turned out to be much more beneficial than the previous one: territorial losses became smaller, the privileges of foreign states and companies previously provided for by the capitulation regime were canceled, the foreign protectorate did not operate, and the external debt of the Ottoman Empire was reduced. Most of these points of the agreement that were successful for Turkey were secured thanks to the position of the Soviet delegation.

Bosphorus

Meanwhile, with regard to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, the solution, intended to be a compromise, turned out to be half-hearted: the convention established free passage through the straits for commercial and military ships of any flag, both in peacetime and in wartime, however, under pressure from Great Britain, a clause on the demilitarization of the straits was included in it , as well as the introduction of restrictions on the number of passing vessels. The created International Commission of the Straits, which included representatives of the countries participating in the conference (except the United States), actually gained control over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles (despite the fact that they nominally remained Turkish territory). Its mission was to prevent possible conflicts.

The USSR did not ratify this convention, since in practice it significantly infringed on its interests as a Black Sea power and did not protect it from possible aggression from non-Black Sea states.

Swiss arrangements

By the early 1930s, the situation determined by the Lausanne conference was not beneficial to any of the Black Sea countries. The general deterioration of the international situation had its effect: the Japanese intervention in Manchuria, the Nazis’ rise to power in Germany, the attack of fascist Italy on Ethiopia. There was a need to reconsider the regime of the straits, for which, on the initiative of Turkey, a new international meeting was convened in June 1936, this time in Montreux. It was attended by representatives of the same states as in Lausanne thirteen years earlier (with the exception of the USA and Italy); Australia became a new participant in the negotiations.

The complete closure of the straits to the passage of military ships was unprofitable for the Soviet Union, since this deprived it of the opportunity to transfer its naval forces to the Black Sea from other seas (for example, from the Baltic). At the same time, their complete opening meant weakening control over the situation in the Black Sea, depriving the USSR of primacy and the emergence of the threat of attack from non-Black Sea powers. It seemed ideal to close the straits to military vessels of non-Black Sea powers, but this option was categorically rejected by Western countries. Therefore, the most balanced position was required from Soviet diplomats.

As expected, the problem of remilitarizing the straits and restoring coastal fortifications did not cause discussion at the conference; the point on the free passage of merchant ships remained unshakable. The most difficult issue again turned out to be the issue of military courts: the British delegation stubbornly refused to recognize the right of the Black Sea powers (primarily Turkey and the USSR) to any special conditions, thereby seeking to maintain British influence in the region. Soviet delegation led by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov defended the thesis about the special situation of our country. So the atmosphere at the conference was very tense, and the main antagonists at it were the USSR and Great Britain.

Despite the tough positions of the parties, the participants of the conference in Montreux managed to reach an agreement in just a month. The main demands of the USSR were accepted: first of all, the Black Sea states were given more favorable treatment than the non-Black Sea states. The International Commission of the Straits was liquidated, and all power over the Bosporus and Dardanelles passed to Turkey. It was her that the other Black Sea powers would henceforth have to notify in advance of the passage of military ships, while their tonnage in peacetime was not limited in any way.

But in relation to non-Black Sea states, restrictions were introduced both on the tonnage of ships, and on their class and time of stay in the Black Sea - no more than 21 days. In the event of a war in which Turkey remains neutral, the straits must be closed to the passage of warships of any belligerent power. If Turkey takes part in the war or sees a threat of attack, then the decision to allow military ships through the straits should remain entirely at its discretion.

POTSKHVERIA B.M. Black Sea Straits in Russian-Turkish Relations // Russian-Turkish Relations: History, Current State and Prospects. M., 2003

"Doesn't let him pass"

At first glance, the Soviet delegation could be celebrating a diplomatic victory. She managed to achieve almost all of her goals: the new convention protected the rights of the Black Sea states and helped strengthen peace in the region. Great Britain had to come to terms with the weakening of its influence here.

However, the winner was, first of all, Turkey, which for the first time since the First World War significantly strengthened its position in the region and received the right to independently regulate the passage regime of the straits in the event of a military threat to it. Moreover, she herself could decide whether such a threat existed or not. And this is an important factor: in the future, as Ankara moved closer to Western countries, Soviet-Turkish relations became increasingly cool, which made it possible for Western countries to have an indirect influence on the situation in the Black Sea region. Joseph Stalin subsequently stated: “... a small state, supported by England, holds a large state by the throat and does not allow it passage.”

After the war, at the Potsdam Conference, the USSR proposed to reconsider the existing situation with a view to creating a naval base in the Dardanelles to ensure freedom of access to the straits regardless of Turkey. In addition, the Soviet government demanded that Ankara return the territories previously transferred to it under the Moscow Treaty. These attempts were not crowned with success and were abandoned in the early 1950s. In turn, the aspirations of the United States, which sought the right to free passage through the straits and, accordingly, the lifting of restrictions for non-Black Sea countries, were also not satisfied. Thus, the status quo was maintained.

Despite some controversy surrounding the straits in the second half of the twentieth century, the Montreux Convention continues to operate today. However, over the past years the situation in the Black Sea region has changed significantly. In particular, since 1936, the tonnage of ships has increased noticeably and the nature of cargo has changed. After the collapse of the USSR, the number of Black Sea states increased. We should not forget that Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania have become members of NATO, which means they are bound by a number of military obligations and agreements with non-Black Sea states.

It is known that in 2008, during the conflict in South Ossetia and in 2014, in connection with the events in Ukraine, US Navy vessels located in the Black Sea exceeded the maximum permissible period of stay there under the Montreux Convention. Therefore, it is possible that in the future this agreement will nevertheless be revised and give way to a new document more appropriate to the time and international situation.

Nikita Brusilovsky

The famous Turkish political scientist Fatih Er actually confirmed that these (NATO) “invasions” are addressed primarily to Russia.

Today it is obvious that the Montreux Convention, while retaining the possibilities for direct and indirect military-political provocations against Russia, is quite suitable for the West.