Bagnenko Sergey Fedorovich emergency medical care. Bagnenko, Sergey Fedorovich. Service in the capital

Born on September 22, 1957 in Kherson. In 1980, he graduated with honors and a gold medal from the S.M. Military Medical Academy. Kirov. He served on surface ships of the Navy as a surgeon. In 1983–1985 he studied in clinical residency at the Department of Naval and Hospital Surgery of the S.M. Military Medical Academy. Kirov, after graduating from which he served for 2 years as part of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Republic of Afghanistan. For the high moral and professional qualities demonstrated during this period, he was awarded the Order “For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces”, III degree.

In 1987, he entered the postgraduate course at the Department of Naval and Hospital Surgery of the Military Medical Academy named after. CM. Kirov, after graduation he was appointed to the position of teacher. In 1990 he defended his candidate’s dissertation, and in 1998 – his doctoral dissertation on the topic “Diagnostics and surgical treatment of chronic biliary pancreatitis.”

In 1998, after leaving the Armed Forces, he was appointed to the position of director of the St. Petersburg Research Institute of Emergency Medicine named after. I.I. Dzhanelidze. In 1999 he was awarded the academic title of professor. In 2000, he was elected head of the Department of Injury Surgery, newly created on his initiative, at the St. Petersburg MAPO, now the North-Western State Medical University. I.I. Mechnikova, since 2010 – head of the department of faculty surgery at St. Petersburg State University.

The results of scientific activities and medical work of S.F. Bagnenko has been published in more than 300 scientific papers, including 14 monographs, manuals and textbooks. He is a co-author of 10 patents for inventions and 1 scientific discovery. Under his leadership, 8 doctoral and 12 candidate dissertations were completed. Professor S.F. Bagnenko successfully formed a scientific school of specialists in the surgery of injuries and diseases of the pancreas.

In 2005, Professor S.F. Bagnenko was elected a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences, and in 2011 - an academician of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences (now the Russian Academy of Sciences) with a specialty in surgery. Since 2006, he has been a member of the expert council of the Higher Attestation Commission for surgical specialties. He is the chief freelance specialist in emergency medical care of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation.

S.F. Bagnenko is the chief surgeon of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation for the North-Western Federal District, chairman of the problem commission “Combined trauma” of the Scientific Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences on emergency medicine, member of the problem commission “Extreme and terminal conditions of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences”, deputy editor-in-chief of the journal “Emergency Medical Care”, member of the editorial board of the journal “Bulletin of Surgery named after. I.I. Grekov" and "Annals of Surgical Hepatology". Since 1998 S.F. Bagnenko heads the City Ambulance Coordination Council and is a member of the Transplant Council.

Sergey Fedorovich Bagnenko is actively involved in public work, was repeatedly elected as a member of the board of the Pirogov Surgical Society, and in 2005–2007 was its chairman. In 2003–2004, he headed the Association of Medical Organizations of St. Petersburg, and is currently vice-president of the all-Russian public organization “Russian Medical Society”. President of the Emergency Medical Care LLC.

During the election
campaign of the President of Russia in 2012, he was the head of the election headquarters of V.V. Putin in St. Petersburg from the All-Russian Popular Front.

Awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces" III degree, the "Medal of the Order of Merit to the Fatherland" II degree, the medal "In memory of the 300th anniversary of St. Petersburg", the badge "Excellence in Health Care" and "Mercy", the medal "For Merit in front of domestic healthcare”, the medal “For the Commonwealth in the Name of Salvation”. Laureate of the Government of the Russian Federation Prize in the field of education (2013) and the Prize of the Government of the Russian Federation in the field of science and technology (2015).

22.09.2017

Anniversary of Academician Sergei Fedorovich Bagnenko

Academician

Bagnenko Sergey Fedorovich

After graduating from the Military Medical Academy named after S.M. in 1980. Kirov (VMA) served for three years on surface ships of the Navy as a surgeon.

In 1983-1985 he studied in clinical residency at the Department of Naval and Hospital Surgery of the Military Medical Academy.

In 1985-1987 served in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as the leading surgeon of a separate medical company in Jalalabad, then a separate medical battalion in Bagram. In 1987, he entered the adjunct program at the Department of Naval and Hospital Surgery of the Military Medical Academy, then in 1990-1998. worked as a teacher at the Department of Naval and General Surgery of the Military Medical Academy. After his dismissal from the Armed Forces, he was appointed to the position of director of the St. Petersburg Research Institute of Emergency Medicine named after. I.I. Janelidze, who led for 14 years.

In 2000, he was elected head of the Department of Injury Surgery at the St. Petersburg Medical Academy of Postgraduate Education (now Northwestern State Medical University named after I.I. Mechnikov), created on his initiative; since 2010, head of the Department of Faculty Surgery at St. Petersburg State University. Since 2012 - acting rector, and since 2013 - rector of the First St. Petersburg State Medical University. Academician I.P. Pavlova.

Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences since 2005, Academician of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences since 2011, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences since 2013 - Department of Medical Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Specialist in emergency and trauma surgery.

Scope of scientific interests of academician S.F. Bagnenko includes the most complex and pressing problems of organizing the provision of emergency medical care, surgery for injuries and diseases of the pancreas, combined trauma, and transplantology. Areas of scientific research and practical activity: injury surgery, abdominal and transplant surgery, diseases of the liver, pancreas, gastrointestinal tract, oncology issues.

Author of the concept of development and reform of emergency medical care at the prehospital and hospital stages in Russia. With his direct participation, a subprogram for the development of ambulance and emergency medical care in the Russian Federation until 2020 was developed and implemented.

S.F. Bagnenko trained 8 doctors and 12 candidates of science, he is forming a scientific school of specialists in the surgery of injuries and diseases of the pancreas, known in Russia and abroad.

Deputy editor-in-chief of the journal “Emergency Medical Care”, member of the editorial board of the journal “Bulletin of Surgery named after. I.I. Grekov" and "Annals of Surgical Hepatology".

Chairman of the problem commission “Combined trauma” of the Scientific Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences on problems of emergency care, member of the problem commission “Extreme and terminal conditions” of the Russian Academy of Sciences, expert of the Higher Attestation Commission for Surgery.

S.F. Bagnenko is the chief surgeon of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation for the Northwestern Federal District, and is the main freelance specialist of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation in emergency medical care.

He was repeatedly elected as a member of the board of the Pirogov Surgical Society, and in 2005-2007 he was its chairman.
He is the vice-president of the all-Russian public organization “Russian Medical Society” and the president of the Public Organization “Emergency Medical Care”. In 2003-2004 he headed the Association of Medical Organizations of St. Petersburg.

In 2008, he was appointed national coordinator for the prevention of accidental injuries at the WHO Regional Office for Europe.

He was awarded the Order “For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces”, III degree, and the medal of the Order “For Services to the Fatherland”, II degree.

Three times laureate of the Russian Government Prize.

Sergey Fedorovich Bagnenko(ukr. Sergiy Fedorovich Bagnenko; genus. September 22) - Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Medical Sciences, Professor.

Biography

Areas of scientific research and practical activity: injury surgery, abdominal and transplant surgery, diseases of the liver, pancreas, gastrointestinal tract, oncology issues.

Political activity

In December 2011, he was elected to the State Duma of the sixth convocation from the United Russia party, but did not become a deputy, giving his place in the State Duma to the ex-head of the Federal Property Management Agency Yuri Petrov.
In February 2012, he was appointed deputy head of the election headquarters in St. Petersburg of Russian presidential candidate Vladimir Putin. In January 2012, the head of the regional executive committee of United Russia, Dmitry Yuryev, reported that in December Bagnenko was appointed head of Putin’s election headquarters in St. Petersburg.

In February 2012, in an interview with Fontanka.ru, he said that the people included in the headquarters are pragmatic and understand that “today, of all the options, this is the most pragmatic and profitable for us,” and further: “I am 90 percent in my heart Yabloko and democrat. We are all democrats at heart. I have never been a member of United Russia. And, like many, I share the criticism leveled at her. On the other hand, I understand that we need a majority in the Legislative Assembly, we must pass laws, and projects must be launched in the city. If there is such a majority in parliament, productive work is possible.”

Awards, bonuses, honorary titles

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Notes

An excerpt characterizing Bagnenko, Sergei Fedorovich

But let’s assume that the people of Europe, under the leadership of Napoleon, had to go deep into Russia and die there, and all the self-contradictory, senseless, cruel activities of the people participating in this war become clear to us.
Providence forced all these people, striving to achieve their personal goals, to contribute to the fulfillment of one huge result, about which not a single person (neither Napoleon, nor Alexander, nor even less any of the participants in the war) had the slightest aspiration.
Now it is clear to us what was the cause of the death of the French army in 1812. No one will argue that the reason for the death of Napoleon’s French troops was, on the one hand, their entry at a late time without preparation for a winter campaign deep into Russia, and on the other hand, the nature that the war took on from the burning of Russian cities and the incitement of hatred towards the enemy in the Russian people. But then not only did no one foresee that (which now seems obvious) that only in this way could the army of eight hundred thousand, the best in the world and led by the best commander, die in a clash with the Russian army, which was twice as weak, inexperienced and led by inexperienced commanders; not only did no one foresee this, but all efforts on the part of the Russians were constantly aimed at preventing the fact that only one could save Russia, and on the part of the French, despite the experience and so-called military genius of Napoleon, all efforts were directed towards this to stretch out to Moscow at the end of summer, that is, to do the very thing that should have destroyed them.
In historical works about 1812, French authors are very fond of talking about how Napoleon felt the danger of stretching his line, how he was looking for a battle, how his marshals advised him to stop in Smolensk, and give other similar arguments proving that it was already understood there was danger of the campaign; and Russian authors are even more fond of talking about how from the beginning of the campaign there was a plan for the Scythian war to lure Napoleon into the depths of Russia, and they attribute this plan to some Pfuel, some to some Frenchman, some to Tolya, some to Emperor Alexander himself, pointing to notes, projects and letters that actually contain hints of this course of action. But all these hints of foreknowledge of what happened, both on the part of the French and on the part of the Russians, are now exhibited only because the event justified them. If the event had not happened, then these hints would have been forgotten, just as thousands and millions of opposing hints and assumptions that were in use then, but turned out to be unfair and therefore forgotten, are now forgotten. There are always so many assumptions about the outcome of every event that takes place that, no matter how it ends, there will always be people who will say: “I said then that it would be like this,” completely forgetting that among the countless assumptions, completely opposite.
Assumptions about Napoleon's awareness of the danger of stretching the line and on the part of the Russians - about luring the enemy into the depths of Russia - obviously belong to this category, and historians can only attribute such considerations to Napoleon and his marshals and such plans to Russian military leaders only with great reserve. All the facts completely contradict such assumptions. Not only throughout the war was there no desire on the part of the Russians to lure the French into the depths of Russia, but everything was done to stop them from their first entry into Russia, and not only was Napoleon not afraid of stretching his line, but he rejoiced at how triumph, every step forward, and very lazily, unlike in his previous campaigns, he looked for battle.
At the very beginning of the campaign, our armies are cut up, and the only goal to which we strive is to unite them, although in order to retreat and lure the enemy into the interior of the country, there does not seem to be any advantage in uniting the armies. The emperor is with the army to inspire it to defend every step of the Russian land, and not to retreat. The huge Dries camp is being built according to Pfuel's plan and it is not intended to retreat further. The Emperor reproaches the commander-in-chief for every step of retreat. Not only the burning of Moscow, but the admission of the enemy to Smolensk cannot even be imagined by the emperor, and when the armies unite, the sovereign is indignant because Smolensk was taken and burned and was not given a general battle before the walls of it.
The sovereign thinks so, but the Russian military leaders and all Russian people are even more indignant at the thought that ours are retreating into the interior of the country.
Napoleon, having cut up the armies, moves inland and misses several occasions of battle. In August he is in Smolensk and thinks only about how he can move on, although, as we now see, this movement forward is obviously detrimental for him.
The facts clearly show that neither Napoleon foresaw the danger in moving towards Moscow, nor Alexander and the Russian military leaders then thought about luring Napoleon, but thought about the opposite. The luring of Napoleon into the interior of the country did not happen according to anyone’s plan (no one believed in the possibility of this), but occurred from the most complex game of intrigues, goals, desires of people - participants in the war, who did not guess what should be, and what was the only salvation of Russia. Everything happens by accident. The armies are cut up at the start of the campaign. We are trying to unite them with the obvious goal of giving battle and holding off the enemy’s advance, but even in this desire to unite, avoiding battles with the strongest enemy and involuntarily retreating at an acute angle, we lead the French to Smolensk. But it’s not enough to say that we are retreating at an acute angle because the French are moving between both armies - this angle is becoming even sharper, and we are moving even further because Barclay de Tolly, an unpopular German, is hated by Bagration (who will become under his command ), and Bagration, commanding the 2nd Army, tries not to join Barclay for as long as possible, so as not to become under his command. Bagration does not join for a long time (although this is the main goal of all commanders) because it seems to him that he is putting his army in danger on this march and that it is most profitable for him to retreat to the left and south, harassing the enemy from the flank and rear and recruiting his army in Ukraine. But it seems that he came up with this because he did not want to obey the hated and junior German Barclay.
The emperor is with the army to inspire it, and his presence and lack of knowledge of what to decide on, and a huge number of advisers and plans destroy the energy of the 1st army’s actions, and the army retreats. Date of Birth: Place of Birth: