Lithuanian services. About Us. Symbols of the headquarters of the MTR

"Express Week" Border is locked tight
("EN" No. 26 of July 26, 2008. Author - Vladimir Zarovsky)
The length of the state border of our country is 1762 kilometers, it is guarded by about 5000 people. The correspondent of "Express Week" visited one of the outposts, tried on a helicopter pilot's seat, visited a school of border guards, where he got acquainted with the "secret weapon" of the State Border Protection Service - beautiful cadets.

How it was and is

Remember the early 90s? Construction trailers on all roads leading from Lithuania, people in camouflage uniforms checking documents - unusual, incomprehensible, frightening. After all, no one could, let alone believe, imagine that a country called the USSR could disappear overnight without slamming the nuclear door in goodbye.
These harmless wagons caused irritation, they were burned, but they appeared again and again. On May 19, 1991, Gintaras Žagunis, the head of the shift at the Krakun border post, died, and then a terrible and senseless massacre followed - on July 31, seven defenders of the Lithuanian border were shot in Medininkai. So, with blood and pain, the border guard service was born.
In 1992, it was renamed the State Service under the Ministry of Regional Protection, and two years later it was transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and reorganized into the Border Police Department, in 2001 the old name was returned - the State Border Protection Service.
After Lithuania joined the Schengen zone, the control of documents on the border with Poland and Latvia was canceled, but with Belarus and the Kaliningrad region it was strengthened. Now the border is guarded by seven detachments. Each detachment consists of outposts, for example, Vilnius - eight: Vilnius and Kaunas airports, Pavoveres, Lavorishkyu, Kenos, Dievinishkyu, Gintaro Zhagune and Padvarenyu. That's where we'll go.

Outpost, in the gun!

No matter how I asked, Giedrius Matkevičius, who temporarily acted as the Padvarenskaya outpost, remembered only one recent case of a "malicious" violation of the border, and even that one was ridiculous. Grandma from that side walked back and forth through the border strip at night, the Lithuanians contacted their Belarusian colleagues, and they took the lost elderly woman away. All these spies, saboteurs, putting on artificial hooves on their feet or, like tatis in the night, jumping over fences with poles under the cover of darkness, remained in that time, and even then, perhaps, more - in old films.
This outpost, like all the others, is unlike the cinema ones. There are no beardless lieutenants with young playful wives, barracks. Outpost in Padvareniai - a newly built building with two wings with an observation tower: rooms for rest of shifts, a kitchen to cook, have a snack, "cool" fashionable Mitsubishi Pajero jeeps, a helipad.
Silence, only grasshoppers forge their fleeting happiness. The staff list includes 136 people: the head of the outpost, two deputies, one senior specialist, 10 specialists, the rest are border guards and service personnel. The border is guarded around the clock, in two shifts of twelve hours: 12 - during the day, 12 - at night. The outpost has been allocated a section of 33 kilometers and 100 meters plus the Medininka checkpoint; about 1,800 vehicles cross it every day. Patrolling takes place in different ways - on cars, on a four-wheeled motorcycle, on foot, it happens that they sit, hiding in a "secret". In winter, you have to get on skis. Last year, border guards drew up 320 protocols on administrative violations: well, who issued visas incorrectly, who violated the regime of the border zone - for example, they did not take the document with them or did not have permission to enter the zone. The majority of the offenders are agricultural, seasonal workers who were hired to prepare hay or firewood, but they forgot to warn about their passports.
From the observation tower, Belarus turned green with forests and bushes - the foreign countries were not impressive, and I asked for a patrol. Dalyus Ilgis and Malekas Ivanovskis are brave young guys, several kilometers of the state border were "cut off" for them: they walk along it, look around. The border is a three-meter-high openwork mesh fence, on top is barbed wire, behind it is a wide control strip, earth loosened by a harrow, a pillar with state Lithuanian symbols, a small white pillar is the physical demarcation border itself, and opposite them is a Belarusian pillar. He approached the grid and looked through the hole at his homeland: the same trees and fields. And only here I felt a poignant sense of the irreversibility of what had happened: we are a cut piece. It is we, Europe, who fenced ourselves off from the Slavic world with a metal fence that went right and left for tens, hundreds of kilometers. It became awkward and empty. The pillars are dug in tightly. Specialists from the EU often come here, and the US ambassador visited. And the school of border guards regularly and regularly releases young replenishment ...

From the very beginning of its independence, since 1991, Lithuania has taken a course towards Western structures, both economic and defense, and overcame the path to them rather quickly. There are several reasons for this, including a relatively small population, a convenient strategic position, and certain traditions. Now the technology of European integration of this country to some extent serves as a model for the current leadership of Ukraine, which has set the task of transferring its armed forces to NATO standards. Lithuanian experience in this matter is invaluable, although it is unlikely that Kyiv will be able to copy it directly. To begin with, a military doctrine should be developed and compared with the goals of the army of this Baltic country. This process will be of interest not only to Ukrainians.

Tasks of the Lithuanian Armed Forces

The task of the Lithuanian army in the event of an enemy attack (meaning Russia, who else?) was formulated by Lieutenant-Colonel Arturas Jasinskasov, representative of the Department of Strategic Communications, in the fall of 2013. It is quite simple - if a war starts, then you need to somehow hold out for a month, conducting "asymmetric" actions, and then the NATO bloc will come into play and help, and most likely, free you. It is difficult to say how realistic it is to achieve such a result in a hypothetical situation described by a high-ranking officer. North Atlantic analysts suggest that it would take the Russian Armed Forces only three days to completely occupy not only Latvia, but also Lithuania and Estonia at the same time. It is possible that "asymmetry" means guerrilla-sabotage operations, which, as you know, cause damage to very strong armies, but nothing was said about this in the policy statement. On the contrary, the emphasis is on the classic military organizational structure, with ground units, artillery, air force and navy.

Ground troops

In 2011, the Lithuanian defense budget allocated $360 million, that is, about a million dollars a day. There are approximately 10,640 regular military personnel in the country, and there are 6,700 more trained specialists in the reserve with experience in army service, including those obtained in the Soviet Army, these are 14,600 soldiers and officers. Of the total number of peacetime personnel, the ground units number 8,200 servicemen, organizationally divided into two motorized, two mechanized and one engineering battalions. The equipment is mixed, partly old Soviet (BRDM-2), but mostly American (M113A1), with a total of 187 light armored vehicles. The Lithuanian army also has artillery, these are 120-mm mortars (61 units), German Carl Gustaf guns (100 units), 18 anti-aircraft guns, as well as portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems.

air force

Aviators in Lithuania are 980 soldiers and officers serving at three air force bases in five squadrons. At the same time, there are only sixteen units of flying equipment. This is not much, but the Ukrainian troops, for example, should not be especially concerned, since after the failures over the Donbass, Kyiv has not much left if more, then not much. There are practically no fighters, attack aircraft and bombers in the Lithuanian Air Force, except for the combat training Czech L-39ZA, capable of delivering strikes in the event of absolute air supremacy. There are also transporters L-410 (small-sized, 2 units) and C-27J (3 units), as well as Mi-8 helicopters (9 units). That's the whole air power of Lithuania.

Fleet

530 sailors serve in the Lithuanian Navy. They comprise coastal personnel, the crews of one small Soviet-built project 1124M anti-submarine ship, three Fluvefisken-class patrol boats (Aukshaitis, Dzukas and Zemaitis), three Storm-class patrol boats (Skalvis, M-53 and M -54), as well as a command ship, also called Skalvis. There is also a tug, a hydrographic ship and three more small boats, border (H-21-H23). The composition of the Lithuanian fleet is currently commensurate with the Ukrainian one. The Coast Guard has 540 sailors.

Mobilization potential and equipment in peacetime

In the event of a war, fit for health reasons men from 16 to 49 years old are subject to mobilization, there are more than 910 thousand of them in the country (in 2011), and about the same number of women of the same age. In peacetime, the staffing of the armed forces is carried out according to a mixed contract-draft principle. At the same time, the number of people who want to serve voluntarily has recently significantly decreased, and out of 23.5 thousand people who reach military age (in the range of 19-26 years), only two-thirds remain in the country, the rest leave to work in Europe. In connection with this circumstance, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite resumed conscription into the army, which had not previously been practiced.

combat training

It is difficult, if not impossible, to train a highly professional military man in 9 months, but given the not very high saturation of equipment, it should be assumed that the bulk of the recruits go to motorized rifle units. This summer, exercises with the loud name "Fire Salvo - 2016" are planned, in which self-propelled guns of the battalion named after. Romualdas Gidraitis under the command of Lieutenant General Aushryus Buikus. There are four such cars in Lithuania, and the Germans will bring the same number for such an occasion, arrival is expected in May. For the first time in many years, these maneuvers will be held with the involvement of conscripts. Firing involves working out the suppression of batteries of a mock enemy at distances up to 40 km. German equipment is being given, as it were, for testing, and based on the results of the exercises, a decision will be made on the purchase of another 16 units of self-propelled artillery mounts that were in use in the Bundeswehr. This is where a very interesting pattern begins to emerge.

How to spend the defense budget of Lithuania?

Lithuania spends on defense significantly less than two percent of the state budget accepted by NATO. In this, she is not alone, many states of the Alliance ignore this requirement, which upsets the leadership of the main members, and part-time sponsors of this organization. Therefore, Vilnius is constantly encouraged to acquire at least some samples, not new ones, but crushing in a NATO way (as today's owners of old weapons assure). In particular, out of 16 Bundeswehr installations, three will have to be immediately dismantled for spare parts in order to repair the rest, which, of course, will scare away all aggressors, and especially Russian ones. Among the enviable and much-needed acquisitions are also produced at different times (mainly in the 60s) command and staff vehicles M577 (26 units), armored recovery vehicles BPz-2 (6 units) and other time-tested units of the military technicians who have worked their time in "first-rate" armies and now have one hundred percent chance of serving the cause of democracy at the forefront of defense.

Not funny

The Lithuanian army could serve as a topic for jokes of its closest neighbors, but humor towards it is extremely rare. The Germans, the Dutch or the French keep their faces serious, because they do not want to betray their true intentions and goals. They need to sell as much obsolete equipment as possible, so they do not interfere in the organization, general purpose and other internal affairs of Lithuania. Does the general hold the position of battalion commander? So what, you know better. Salag call for nine months? It's probably better for you. The Russian military also has no reason to laugh at the Lithuanians. The more junk they buy, the calmer it will be on the western border. Ukrainians also bought Saxon armored vehicles in Britain ...

The mission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania is to provide diplomatic means for the protection of state sovereignty and security, the sustainable development of the state in the long term and the well-being of citizens, the protection of the legitimate interests of Lithuanian citizens abroad, the promotion of exports and the attraction of investments into the country.

Tasks

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania implements the foreign policy of the state. The Ministry promotes and protects the interests of the state and its citizens and is an integral part of the international geopolitical situation, Lithuania assumed international obligations.

The President of the Republic of Lithuania makes decisions on key foreign policy issues and implements foreign policy jointly with the government. The agreements of the main political parties on the strategic milestones of foreign, defense and security policy are of great importance for the implementation of the strategic goals of foreign policy. When implementing the strategic objectives of its activities, the Ministry is guided by the program of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the strategic plan of the Ministry.

Strategic Goals

Priority areas of activity of the Ministry for 2014-2016:

• increasing the competitiveness of the Lithuanian economy through economic diplomacy;
• contributing to the implementation of strategic energy projects;
• being active in the European Union, strengthening cooperation with neighboring countries, expanding ties with the countries of the Eastern Partnership;
• ensuring the availability and quality of consular services, strengthening the ties of compatriots abroad with their homeland;
• contributing to the strengthening of regional and international security, participation in the formation of NATO policy and strengthening of transatlantic ties.

Structural divisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania

• Administrative department,
• Department of Finance,
• Department of Economic Security Policy,
• Department of European Union countries,
• European Department,
• Department of Information and Public Relations,
• Department of Information Technology,
• Department of Foreign Economic Relations,
• Department of the United Nations, International Organizations and Human Rights,
• consular department,
• Department of Latin America, Africa, Asia and Oceania,
• personnel department,
• Department of Foreign Policy Planning,
• Eastern Neighborhood Policy Department,
• Department of Law and International Treaties,
• Department of Transatlantic Cooperation and Security Policy,
• Department for work with compatriots abroad,
• Development Cooperation Department,
• Department of State and Diplomatic Protocol.

Network of diplomatic missions

During the 25 years of independence, Lithuania has established diplomatic relations with 181 states, of which 179 are members of the United Nations.

There are 58 diplomatic missions of Lithuania in the world: 39 embassies, 8 consulates general, 3 consulates, an office of the Lithuanian embassy, ​​a special mission and 7 representations at national organizations.

There are diplomatic representations of 33 states in Lithuania: the office of embassies of 2 states and 11 representations of international organizations.

Representative offices of these international organizations operate in our country: the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, the Nordic Investment Bank, the office of the International Finance Corporation in Vilnius, the country office of the World Health Organization in Lithuania, the office of the Nordic Council of Ministers in Lithuania ; NATO Center of Excellence for Energy Security; office of the International Organization for Migration in Vilnius. An agency of the European Union, the European Institute for Gender Equality, operates in Vilnius.

Awards of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

• In 2003, the medal "For Merit in the Diplomatic Service of the Republic of Lithuania" was established.
• From 2007 to 2009, the honorary badge "Star of the Millennium of Lithuania" was awarded.
• In 2010, gold, silver and bronze crosses were added to the medal "For Distinction in the Diplomatic Service of Lithuania".
• Since 2010, the honorary badge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "Star of Lithuanian Diplomacy" has been awarded.

The most important laws establishing the legal basis for the activities of the diplomatic service and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

• Law “On the Diplomatic Service of the Republic of Lithuania” (Ved. 1999, No. 7-140, updated version of 23 April 2013) This Law establishes the legal basis for the formation and functioning of the diplomatic service of the Republic of Lithuania, the legal status and social guarantees of their families.
• Implementation of the Law “On the Diplomatic Service of the Republic of Lithuania” (Ved. 1999, No. 7-141. Updated on April 11, 2000);
• Consular Statute (Ved. 1995, No. 43-1047. Actual edition of December 29, 2012).
• Decree of the Government “On approval of the Regulations on special attachés” dated December 12, 1997, No. 1407.

Lithuania: Baltic "virtual" spies

The country's intelligence system consists of:

State Security Department Lithuania;

Second Department of Operational Services(former intelligence and counterintelligence) under the Ministry of Regional Defense (IOC) - "Antrasis operativiniu tarnybu departamenatas prie KAM" (AOTD prie KAM - (Krasto apsaugos ministerija);

Special Investigation Service(Specialiuju tyrimu tarnyba - in Lithuanian STT);

Special services in the General Staff and KASP (Krasto apsaugos savanoriskosios pajegos - Volunteer forces for the protection of the region);

Department of protection of the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs("Vadovybes apsaugos departamentas prie Vidaus reikalu ministerijos").

Remembering past "battles"

When the special services of this country celebrated their fifteenth anniversary, the "young" veterans of the "secret war" had something to remember in a narrow circle of work colleagues.

It all started in 1991, when three special services were established: the Department of State Security (DGB) - responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence (in Lithuania it is often called simply GB); The Department of Defense of the Territory (DOK) - the secret police, state protection and border protection and the DRC (Department of Intelligence and Counterintelligence) under the General Staff - the military intelligence and counterintelligence service.

The harsh actions of the DGB and the DOK in the early nineties of the last century against the left forces, the Russian-speaking and Polish minorities, members of the Communist Party banned in the country, as well as relatives of the communists who emigrated to Russia, provoked a protest in the West and among the local intelligentsia. It seemed to many that the country was slipping into a police state. This scenario of the development of the situation was real.

One of the steps towards this goal was the creation of a special department of covert operations, which specialized in searching for Lithuanian functionaries of the CPSU. It was headed by an American citizen of Lithuanian origin, who was trained in the ranks of the American Green Berets, Euwe Andrius. Among the successful actions is the capture on the territory of independent Belarus in early January 1994 of the former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania, Mykolas Burokyavichyus, and the head of the organizational department of the Central Committee, Jozas Yermalavichyus.

Three years later, they, as well as four other communists, were sentenced to various terms (from one and a half to twelve years) in prison for participating in the events of January 13, 1991. Recall that on that day there was an assault on the Vilnius TV tower and the building of the Lithuanian Radio and Television, as a result of which 11 people were killed and 300 were injured. Mykolas Burokevičius was found guilty of incitement to premeditated murder with aggravated circumstances, the creation of anti-state organizations, open calls for the violent violation of Lithuanian sovereignty, and other crimes. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison in a strict regime colony. The former head of the ideological department of this party, Jozas Ermalavičius, was found guilty of creating anti-state organizations and openly calling for a violent violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania. The court sentenced him to 8 years in prison in a strict regime colony.

Another little-known episode is the active participation in the organization of the transfer to the West of the former employee of the archival department of the PGU KGB (foreign intelligence), ex-major Vasily Mitrokhin. He held this post until 1984 - until he retired. He secretly copied many top-secret documents, and then sent his archive to the UK. Mitrokhin lived on the shores of foggy Albion for twelve years - from November 1992 until his death in January 2004.

From Russia to the UK, he got a circuitous route - through Lithuania and Sweden. So says the former Minister of Defense of the Lithuanian Territory Audrius Butkevičius. And his colleague, Colonel Virginijus Chesnulyavičius, ex-head of the Immunity Service of the Lithuanian Territory Protection Ministry, said: “The Lithuanian special services participated in the operation of exporting Mitrokhin and his archive to the UK, which became one of the most tangible blows to the KGB in the entire history of this organization.” According to him, the Lithuanian special services joined the operation on the initiative of British intelligence agents MI-5 in early 1992.

Česnulyavičius said that Mitrokhin and his family had arrived in Lithuania under the pretext of vacationing at the popular Lithuanian resort of Druskininkai in the former USSR. In Vilnius, they were met by Lithuanian intelligence officers and taken to Klaipeda, where a ship flying the Swedish flag was already waiting for him. It delivered the former KGB archivist and his archive to Sweden, and a few days later to Great Britain.

In 1994, employees of the DGB and the DOK "lit up" on contacts with the militants of Dzhokhar Dudayev in Chechnya. From that moment began a series of scandals. For example, Russian counterintelligence officers captured the Lithuanian instructor Sosnovkis, who trained Chechen fighters and at the same time served in the MLC. Vilnius promptly abandoned its employee and called him a voluntary mercenary. This is what almost all the intelligence services of the world do in similar situations. Numerous contacts of Chechen fighters and Lithuanian intelligence officers were then revealed. The cover was provided by officer Vaitenkus. At the same time, other DGB officers (Arbachauskas, Petronis, and others) were accused of recruiting Russian citizens of Lithuania, who were then sent to Russia.

The lack of agents, foreign personnel and simply qualified employees in the local special services led to the fact that many unverified national personnel turned out to be in the ranks of these structures. In the early nineties of the last century, ardent nationalists, swindlers and just amateurs worked there. A typical scandal of that era: in 1994, officer Vitkunas was arrested in the State Security Service by the internal security service, who used secret documents and operational information to blackmail Lithuanian politicians for his own personal purposes.

Nationalists and radicals from the "organs"

In the mid-nineties of the last century, a “purge” began in the special services. First of all, ardent nationalists were fired. Sometimes it was necessary to disband entire units. Such a fate befell, for example, the Kaunas branch of the Children's State Security. Individual employees were deprived not only of their jobs, but also of their freedom. In 1997, the founder of the DOC, Butkevičius, was brought to trial for corruption in his department and the illegal arms trade. At the trial, he referred to his heroic past as a fighter against the totalitarian regime, threatened to tell the details of the cooperation of many of the country's leading politicians with the KGB of the USSR, but such statements did not help, and he was convicted.

Personnel changes did not affect individual employees of the special services. They continued their secret activities. Many of them not only covered and provided the necessary information to the terrorists from the groups "Thunder", "Black Crows", "Voluntary Service for the Protection of the Territory", but were also the direct developers and perpetrators of terrorist attacks. Many of them were exposed as members of these groups in 1995-1999.

In the first days of September 1997, the Vilnius Department of the State Security Service arrested a group of seven former and current employees of the PLC, who were preparing an assassination attempt on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko during his visit to Lithuania. He intended to take part in an international conference on problems of European security.

One of the members of the group is Vytautas Drasutis, an employee of the Šiauliai division of the voluntary guard of the region, who once graduated from the Leningrad Higher Military Command School of the Ministry of Defense of the former USSR. This thirty-two-year-old officer was supposed to guard some objects in Vilnius during the conference.

According to local journalists, the organizers of the assassination attempt were detained on the basis of a recording of their meeting made by the Lithuanian special services. Also, according to reporters, explosives were supposed to be used as a murder weapon - one of the detainees was a professional sapper.

The Black Crows group was liquidated only in 2000. Abromavicius, an employee of the DOK, voluntarily turned himself in and testified against his colleagues, who decided to create a “death squadron”. Former comrades did not forgive him for betrayal: he was soon blown up. The bomb was planted under the bottom of his car.

In 1999, new Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus discovered PKD surveillance. As the presidential guard found out, surveillance was organized by a secret group of right-wingers from the MLC and the DGB. It turned out that they acted at the request of Speaker of the Seimas Vytautas Landsbergis and Minister of the Interior Vidmantas Ziemelis, who shared right-wing views. The official was immediately fired. Following him, hundreds of employees were expelled from the bodies. In addition to the nationalists, those who served in the KGB or the GRU lost their jobs. This is how another correction of the image of local special services began.

In the secret "service" of Moscow

In 2001, the Children's State Security staff decided to congratulate their boss on his fiftieth birthday by presenting him with a "royal" gift. The night before, on May 21, under the bridge, near the Vingis park in Vilnius, counterintelligence officers detained a former employee of the Special Investigation Service under the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Eugenijus Jonik. From the hiding place, this person was supposed to withdraw the "diplomat" with one thousand dollars, which was allegedly pawned there by a resident of Russian intelligence in Lithuania. They never detained a foreign spy, and a photojournalist from the largest Lithuanian newspaper could not take the necessary photos - it was pouring rain, but this did not overshadow the joy of the hero of the day.

The problems started later. First, the prosecutor's office dropped the charges of treason against the detainee. And then other juicy moments of this operation became clear.

It all started with the fact that, while working in the Special Investigation Service, he dealt with the problem of corruption among law enforcement officers. Some of the Lithuanian "werewolves in uniform" did not like his activity. He was followed and ordered to close the investigation. He refused to do so and after some time resigned of his own accord. Then he worked for some time in a kindergarten, the head of which was his mother. And then he decided to move to Russia, where his father lived - a retired officer of the Soviet army. To do this, he turned to the Russian Embassy, ​​but never met with the diplomat. But a certain courier began to call him regularly, who brought a package from "Yuri Ivanovich" from Riga.

Eugenijus Jonik took the envelope from the "postman". It contained: a ticket from Siauliai to Riga, a map of the Old Town and a booklet of the Victoria Hotel, where the meeting was scheduled. "Yuri Ivanovich" spoke Russian with a clear Baltic accent and constantly confused the middle name of the interlocutor. Also, the "diplomat" introduced himself as an employee of the "Intelligence Service of Russia" and asked to sign a cooperation agreement with ... the FSB. He chose the word "Snowball" as the agent's pseudonym. The first task for the newly baked spy looked like this: to get the texts of laws regulating the activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as to collect information about the cadets of the Vilnius Police Academy (since, according to him, personnel for the DGB are recruited from them).

No less surprising were the actions of the "Snowball". He not only agreed to fulfill the task of the strange "Yuri Ivanovich" (Lithuanian Chekists claim that it was Yuri Kondratiev, the third secretary of the Russian Embassy in Latvia), but also took concrete steps. He was going to put into the hiding place: his own thesis “Possibilities of operational work in the fight against organized crime” along with a list of local Šiauliai authorities (genuine) and a list of corrupt Šiauliai police officers (fictitious); secret order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Lithuania No. 004, based on the law of the MVL of the USSR No. 0015 (published in the Lithuanian open press as early as 1997), etc.

The scheme of the operational game, which was implemented by the Lithuanian counterintelligence officers, is not new. For example, the FBI similarly exposed retired FBI Sergeant Robert Lipke ("Dan", "Rook"). This man actively cooperated with the Soviet foreign intelligence from 1965 to 1967 and handed over two hundred important documents to the NSA, the CIA, the State Department, etc. Then he stopped his cooperation with the KGB and quit the NSA. Communication with him was lost. In 1996, an FBI officer came to him and introduced himself as Captain Nikitin from the GRU. The retired agent believed and met four times with the “envoy” of Moscow. And then Robert Lipke was arrested.

New scandals

Scandals continue to shake the DGB in subsequent years. For example, when in April 2004 the procedure for changing the general director of the DGB was going on, the local media actively discussed the information that the new chief of the special service, Arvydas Pocius, was in the “KGB reserve”. According to one of the local newspapers, while working in the prosecutor's office of the city of Marijampolė, he agreed to be included in the KGB reserve "for a special period." According to the newspaper's sources, Arvydas Pocius was not a full-time KGB officer, but in the Prosecutor General's Office he went under the nickname "Major". According to unconfirmed reports, he could have been awarded the rank of Major of the KGB in the reserve. The newspaper draws attention to the strange fact that when this information was announced three years ago, Arvydas Pocius did not refute it. However, today he denies any connection with the Soviet state security. Despite this "dark place" in his biography, Arvydas Pocius served as deputy head of the VSD.

Another juicy detail of his appointment. The previous head of the DGB, Mechis Laurinkus (allegedly a career diplomat, has been in the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry since the establishment of this department in 1991, there is another version of his work in the nineties of the last century) planned to leave his post and leave as ambassador to Spain in early 2004. He considered Arvydas Pocius as his successor. But the former president of the republic, Rolandas Paksas, wanted to see another person working in the Ministry of Defense as the head of the special services. It cost the head of state his post. The State Security Department prepared and submitted to the parliament a certificate stating the facts of the country's leader's violation of the Constitution and the presidential oath. The Seimas removed the President from office during the impeachment proceedings on April 6, 2004.

After that, a serious conflict began between the former head of state and the Children's State Security Service. At the end of April 2004, the prosecutor's office formally charged Rolandas Paksas with disclosing state secrets.

Prosecutor General of the Prosecutor's Office Mindaugas Duda said that the ex-president was charged under article 125 of the Criminal Code, which provides for punishment for divulging state secrets, including if it happened through negligence. According to the Code, a person who discloses information that is a state secret of the Republic of Lithuania, but his espionage activities have not been proven, is punished by a ban on holding certain positions and activities, or a fine, or imprisonment for up to three years.

Let us clarify that one of the charges was that Rolandas Paksas deliberately made it clear to the main sponsor of his election campaign, Russian businessman Yuri Borisov, that his telephone conversations were tapped by law enforcement agencies.

The ex-president had to tell in detail about this conversation not only in the prosecutor's office, but also in the State Security Service during the pre-trial investigation into the disclosure of state secrets by him. Although the employees of the Department were interested not only in this, but also in how, at the end of October 2003, the secret information about the threat to national security got into the media and how secret information about the privatization of some enterprises, presented by the State Security Service to the presidential residence, was at the disposal of unauthorized persons . The fact is that the Lithuanian parliamentary commission, which investigated the accusation of the presidential administration of leaking secret information back in December 2003, admitted that Rolandas Paksas was directly responsible for this. And the head of the commission stated that "we have identified several incidents when information was leaked from the presidential administration, and once when information was leaked personally from the president."

Let us tell you more about what the ex-head of the DGB Mechis Laurinkus was doing in the last decade of the last century. In 1994, he worked as a "tourism consultant" at JSC "Gausa". At first, the company actively collected money from the population, promising 7-14% profit per month, and then mysteriously went bankrupt. "Classic" financial pyramid. He then headed the security service of a commercial bank whose president died under mysterious circumstances. Moreover, Mechis Laurinkus was the last person to see the banker alive. Although these episodes of the biography of the ex-head of the Children's State Security have not been officially confirmed.

official chronicle

The leaders of the Lithuanian special services try not to mention everything told above. For journalists, they have their own version of what happened in the last decade of the last century. In 1999, it was told to the journalist of the Russian newspaper Nezavisimoe Voennoye Obozreniye, Igor Korotchenko, by the general director of the Children's State Security Mechis Laurinkus. In particular, he said that in the process of creating a new department in 1990, “choosing the model of a special service, we understood that there are classic functions that have not changed for centuries: intelligence, counterintelligence, protection of state secrets. At the same time, Lithuania's economic security was introduced, you can also call it economic counterintelligence, which also exists in Western countries. In terms of its content, this is a very capacious function; our tasks in this area of ​​activity intersect to a certain extent with the tasks of the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In 1994, a law was adopted that regulates in detail the activities of the VSD. In particular, it says that our competence is intelligence, analysis of political and economic trends in foreign countries, including through the study of open sources of information. It’s like an attempt to see what is happening in neighboring countries on the basis of one’s own capabilities.”

Another important function is to ensure the security of government communications.

According to Mechis Laurinkus, the fight against organized crime was the priority direction of the VSD activity. “During its existence, the Children's State Security Service has mainly solved precisely these tasks. In Lithuania, part of the financial flows go through criminal structures; organized crime groups are showing interest in the privatization process. We strive to neutralize the activities of criminals as much as possible. Our verification of those wishing to participate in privatization made it possible to prevent access to this area by a number of influential criminal structures and their representatives, against whom criminal cases were initiated. So all the work was aimed at counteracting economic crime.

Along with this, counterintelligence operations occupy an important place in the activities of the State Security Service in order to ensure the internal security of the state, as well as to counter possible threats, no matter where they come from.”

Unlike, for example, Estonia, Lithuanian counterintelligence officers do not single out the country - the "main enemy" against which they are working. For example, Russia. Moreover, the head of the DGB diplomatically stated in 1999 that "we proceed from the fact that, according to the statements of the official representatives of the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service), this special service does not carry out intelligence activities against Lithuania." It is possible that this is so. Until at least 1999, "not a single employee of the Russian embassy in Vilnius was declared persona non grata."

The DGB cooperates with the FSB on certain issues. “Good contacts, for example, have been established with the FSB Directorate for the Kaliningrad Region. We maintain these links in order to coordinate efforts to combat drug and arms trafficking. Recently, a joint operation was carried out with the participation of law enforcement agencies of the Netherlands, Lithuania, Belarus and Russia. We seized two tons of hashish” - this is a quote from an interview with Mechis Laurinkus.

Almost nothing is known about the successes and failures of the local "knights of the cloak and dagger". The exception is victories in the fight against smuggling and organized crime.

The problem with personnel for the new special service was solved in the same way as with the neighbors - Estonia and Latvia. The Director General of the Lithuanian State Security Service said: “The new Lithuanian special service was located three hundred meters from the building of the Republican KGB. The government and the Seimas, of course, did not recognize its legitimacy, and the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR, in turn, did not recognize the legitimacy of the state institutions of the Republic of Lithuania. This dual situation continued until the events of August 1991, after which the activities of the Soviet state security structures on our territory were terminated.

Some employees of the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR decided in their sympathies immediately after the proclamation of the independence of Lithuania. There were 36 of them. Some of them I then adopted. These were young officers, graduates of educational institutions of the KGB of the USSR in Moscow and Minsk. However, now there is not a single person from among the former KGB officers in the DGB, since Lithuania has adopted a law restricting the work of former employees of the USSR special services at strategic facilities, and this category of persons does not have the right to work with state secrets. True, there are those who help us on an emergency basis.

What to do with "ex"

At the beginning of 2000, the Law “On Registration, Recognition, Accounting and Protection of Confessed Persons Who Secretly Collaborated with the former Soviet Special Services that Occupied Lithuania in 1940-1990” was adopted. According to an employee of the Lithuanian State Security Department, Rimantas Martinkenas, “persons who collaborated with the KGB or other special services of the former USSR were required to, within six months (from February 5 to August 5, 2000. - Note. auth.) call the Department of State Security and arrange a time when they can arrive and tell the members of the commission about their activities.” Who can not come himself - they will come to the house ...

According to the law, a special commission, which includes employees of the Lithuanian "authorities", the center of genocide and resistance and the Prosecutor General's Office, must evaluate the activities of persons who collaborated with the KGB, make decisions on putting them on record. These persons are invited to "confess in writing to secret cooperation, disclose information about the activities of the special services and hand over the available documents and items related to the secret services of the USSR." At the same time, of course, the Lithuanian authorities promise to keep everything passed to them in secret. But if the “soiled themselves” try to hide or give distorted information, the Lithuanian authorities reserve the right to publish data on their cooperation with the KGB. In addition, those who do not want to be frank for 10 years are prohibited from entering the civil service. It only remains to add that about 30,000 people are suspected of collaborating with the "authorities". However, given the then order, this figure can be considered underestimated: in those years, "the opera was written" by almost every third, and even the second.

During the first month of the law's operation, more than 100 informers registered with the VSD. About this and the fact that the process "is going on consistently, normally, there are no problems", said on March 7, 2000 the head of the Department of State Security Mechis Laurinkus.

The main enemy is Moscow

The "peaceful" image of the Lithuanian special services, which the ex-head of the State Security Service so diligently demonstrated in an interview with the journalist of the Independent Military Review, is spoiled by numerous spy scandals related to Russia.

The first of these entered the modern history of the secret war under the name of "virtual" espionage. When studying the materials of this case, one gets the feeling that this is the plot of a poorly written spy novel. After all, all employees of the Lithuanian special services surprise with their amateurism.

Thanks to the efforts of journalists, the student Pavel Ilyin (operational pseudonym "Student") was turned into a superhacker who, on an assignment from the CIA and the DGB, was supposed to penetrate the computer network of the central office of the FSB. After the failure and deportation from the territory of the Kaliningrad region, the cyberspy filed a lawsuit against one of the employers - the Department of State Security of Lithuania. This department, according to the plaintiff, did not fulfill its obligations in case of failure (refused it). In itself, the fact of filing such a claim is of little interest. Several traitors from the KGB tried to sue British intelligence, but to no avail. In Student's case, something else is interesting and unusual - everything that happened in the course of the investigation. It is not every day that the FSB announces the arrest of foreign agents who are trying to penetrate the departmental computer network, although there are plenty of people who want to "hack" the official Lubyanka website.

First, the version of the FSB press service, voiced by domestic journalists: “This ridiculous-looking, thin, bespectacled twenty-five-year-old boy under the pseudonym “Student” has already entered the history of Russian counterintelligence. Because the operation to decrypt and neutralize it took place in a "virtual" space, in which, it would seem, there are no traces left, no appearances, addresses, and a real danger of being exposed. When the operatives were playing a game with a spy, at some point they felt that "a huge monster was caught in the virtual world" .

In fact, everything was easier. Here is the personal data on the virtual "James Bond", published in one of the Russian newspapers.

Surname Name Patronymic: Ilyin Pavel Sergeevich.

Education: 5th year student of Vilnius Technical University.

Places of work: 1998 JSC "Alternative security technologies"; 1999 - JSC "Baltic Computer Center"; from June 15, 1999 to May 2, 2000 - senior tax inspector of the Trakai branch of the State Tax Inspectorate (resigned of his own free will).

Date and reason for cooperation with the Lithuanian special services: in 1995, he was recruited by the DRB officers on compromising evidence. The operational name is "Student". He is in touch with the employees of the DGB Linas Petronis and captain Rytis Arbachauskas (born in 1975).

Let's talk more about Linas Petronis. His biography partially explains the many professional mistakes made by the Lithuanian counterintelligence officers when organizing an operational game with the participation of the Student. In 1990, this man graduated from the Military-Political Academy. Lenin. Prior to his dismissal from the CIS Joint Armed Forces in 1992, he served as deputy head of the political department of the 466th anti-aircraft missile brigade of the 27th air defense corps. The testimonial (prepared upon dismissal) stated that during his work in the party organization from December 1990 to May 1992 (that is, after Lithuania declared independence and was recognized as such by the world community), Major Linas Petronis “has proven himself dedicated to the cause of the Communist Party and the socialist Motherland. He showed a deep knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory, which he skillfully applies in everyday educational work. A principled, honest communist, he has a well-deserved prestige among his comrades. He is very active in the international education of military personnel ... ”Having successfully retired from the“ occupying ”army, he entered the Department of Counterintelligence of the Lithuanian Ministry of Regional Protection - and from there went to serve in the State Security Service, where he began to oversee finances, border guards and rail transportation.

Since February 1999, Pavel Ilyin has been involved as the main executor of a special operation to infiltrate the computer and information security units of the FSB, which was conducted under the leadership of the CIA.

To this end, the Student several times tried to make virtual contact with the FSB, using the Internet for this. Let's clarify that we are talking about e-mail correspondence. In the letters, the initiator said that he worked as a senior tax inspector and performed the duties of an agent of the State Security Service, but he loved the homeland of his ancestors and wanted to become an agent of the FSB. He himself offered the addresses of the "post boxes" to Moscow. It was they who alerted the Russian counterintelligence officers. First, the fact that they did not receive any mail from other recipients. In other words, these "boxes" were created specifically for correspondence with Moscow. It is possible that the KGB secretly regularly checked the contents of the box. Technically, this procedure is easy to implement. Later it turned out that the mail was taken from them from one computer, which was installed in the operational apartment of the DGB. For this reason or another, the FSB ignored his proposal.

In fact, the fact that the Student himself chose the “mailbox” and nothing came to it is not surprising. The usual precaution. But the fact that the “seizure” of mail took place from the same computer is really a “puncture” of the Lithuanian special services. In theory, the Student was supposed to use Internet cafes and other places of access to the World Wide Web. Each time leaving a new place. In this case, it would be extremely difficult to “locate” it. And so he quickly fell under the "hood" of the Russian counterintelligence. This is provided that the Lubyanka really established the place from where he checked his mailbox.

The student was controlled not only by the FSB, but also by the CIA. Moreover, the latter did it so unprofessionally that the agent discovered "surveillance", although he did not understand who exactly put him under the "hood". Chekists also recorded the mistake of their colleagues and drew the appropriate conclusions.

Without waiting for an answer, in the spring of 1999, the Student arrives in Kaliningrad and offers his services to the regional department of the FSB as an agent-initiator. At the second meeting in Kaliningrad, in order to stir up interest, the Student tells Russian counterintelligence officers that he is in contact with the DGB and has a large amount of documentary material at his disposal. Then, motivating the impossibility of further trips to the Russian Federation, he proposes to hold a rendezvous on the territory of third countries under the pretext of transferring secret data allegedly recorded by him on a computer hard drive, as well as photographic footage, to the FSB. Among the places of possible meetings, they are especially persistently offered Poland, then Sweden, Finland and France. I wonder how he could motivate his trips to Western countries to the Lithuanian law enforcement agencies? After all, his official income was small.

Let us turn again to the "official" version of the Lubyanka. The operational combination of the CIA and the DGB had several goals. The main one is the withdrawal of the curator Student from the Kaliningrad FSB abroad with his further capture by local security services and a subsequent recruitment attempt. To this end, Pavel Ilyin had to hand over a package with classified materials to his FSB contact abroad. Further, the Russian counterintelligence officer would be faced with a choice: either a long-term prison sentence for espionage, or work as a CIA agent. In case of refusal, an active operation was envisaged with the involvement of leading Western media in order to create an unfavorable background for Russia on the eve of the Moscow summit between Vladimir Putin and Bill Clinton.

Another task of Pavel Ilyin, as an agent of the State Security Service (he was not a full-time employee), was to actually find out what the technical equipment and practical training of FSB computer specialists were. The student regularly contacted representatives of the Lubyanka by e-mail (by the way, the correspondence was disguised as a communication between two "gays" - this does not arouse suspicion on the Internet), offering to provide Russian counterintelligence with a huge amount of information from the computer database of the DGB. For example, a complete archive of agents. After that, in the words of a high-ranking Russian counterintelligence officer in charge of computer security, “you can disband the FSB, leaving three eggheads and even border guards with Dzhulbars, and just wait.”

This also alerted domestic counterintelligence officers. As an agent (rather than an employee) of the DGB and a (less than average) hacker, he could not access the contents of the top-secret database. After all, for this he needs to overcome multi-level protection.

Pavel Ilyin's e-mails always contained some kind of proposal. For example, a letter dated April 19: “Briefly about the materials: these will be documents obtained by agents that compromise the Russian government; a piece of paper - and the end of the loans.

A computer method was proposed for obtaining it: the FSB was supposed to create an electronic mailbox somewhere in Brazil, where Pavel Ilyin would send the information he obtained. It is clear that in a minute after the address of this box would become known to the Student, all virtual inputs and outputs from it would be put under control and the CIA would receive as a result the real computer addresses of the FSB. The Chekists did just that when it was necessary to put Pavel Ilyin himself under control of the "mailboxes".

Another example. The agent offered to download the information directly from the DGB computer. “Work fast, don't run any other programs except FAR, and choose your most powerful computer, if it doesn't connect, then I'm sorry, it didn't work out. Then on April 8, 2000 I will be in Mikołajki on the territory of Poland and I will be able to convey everything to you.” In this case, the CIA would get an idea of ​​the power of the computers used by the FSB and the real address from which the connection would take place. Maybe it is. Although in this case, the very procedure for accessing the DGB computer is surprising. It feels like he's the only one in the entire organization.

There was also such a message: “... I collected almost all the materials by 70-75 percent and grabbed a small one, because a very fat piece in the owners’ office ... but with the preparation of the remaining 30 percent, I will need your help, namely, the help of an ORACLE consultant, because that I don’t know ORACLE and I don’t have the time, desire, or opportunity to learn…”. Thus, according to the "official version", the capabilities of the FSB in modern software and the level of training of specialists were established.

There is also a third version of the plans for using the Student. As he later told the FSB operatives, the curators from the DGB oriented him to the prospect of "playing" with the Lubyanka for a period of six to seven years. An “advanced” guy, a hacker in the past, was supposed to infiltrate the computer information security unit of the FSB in order to obtain information about the organization of his work, personnel, and level of professionalism. For Americans, such information is a real treasure. It sounds nice, but its implementation is hindered by two important factors.

First, the other operation has already been described above. Her goal is to recruit or arrest an FSB operative who will meet with the agent. Whatever the outcome, when the Chekist agrees or refuses the proposal of the Americans, the Student is “exposed”. It is clear that when the Chekist is arrested, the main suspicion will fall on Pavel Ilyin, and this is the end of his career as an informer of the Lubyanka. Plus, the increased attention of journalists. And they will do everything to find out the details of the spy meeting. And if the Chekist gives his consent to cooperation, then where is the guarantee that, upon returning to Russia, he will not report what happened to his leadership. And in this case the Student failed. Even if the Chekist becomes a traitor, they will try to “demobilize” Pavel Ilyin from the front of the “secret war”. Suddenly he will “fail” and at the very first interrogation he will tell everything that he knows. Actually, that's how it happened.

Secondly, the very idea of ​​hiring (full-time or part-time) a citizen of a foreign state, moreover, an agent of the special services sounds extremely ridiculous. There are many arguments that support this thesis. For example, the level of his professional training as a hacker is not very high. Many students of Russian technical universities have the same or higher level of training in the field of information technology. At the same time, they all have Russian citizenship and did not cooperate with foreign special services.

Most likely, the story of a multi-year operation was supposed to stimulate the activity of the agent, as well as a salary of $ 150 a month. An officer of the DGB (excluding various allowances) received monthly (in 1999) 200 dollars.

Pavel Ilyin's contacts with the employees of the Lithuanian State Security Department who took care of him took place in one of the departments of the State Security Service in Vilnius (by the way, the British Embassy is located nearby) at 4a Antkalno Street. At the same address, the appearance of several officers of the Vilnius residency of the SIS was repeatedly noted. In this regard, it is possible that the British intelligence service MI6 was also aware of the operation being carried out by the CIA.

Regardless of further plans for use, the Student came to a meeting with representatives of the FSB in Kaliningrad. There he was expected by a "warm" meeting and a nine-hour conversation with the Chekists. After her, Pavel Ilyin was deported to Lithuania without the right to enter the territory of Russia. The details of the operation carried out by the FSB were reported to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who gave it a high rating.

The spy scandal did not end there, but flared up even more. It is possible that the meeting in Kaliningrad was not the final chord of the operation of domestic Chekists, but one of the stages. This explains the nine-hour conversation with the FSB officers (filmed on videotape - fragments of this recording will be shown on Russian television) and the student's quiet (without scandal) return home.

He arrived in Vilnius inspired by success, from the point of view of the DGB and the CIA, the introduction into the FSB computer system was going well. It is known that at the time of Pavel Ilyin's return to Lithuania, both of his curators from the Children's State Security were awarded regular military ranks. And the agent himself received a $5,000 bonus.

Although the agent may have sensed the completion of the operation. From the last virtual message of Pavel Ilyin: “I write letters like hell knows where, I ask one question - I don’t get an answer, I ask another question - I get the devil knows what instead of an answer. If you don’t need these games, we quietly say goodbye, summarize the financial results and do not spoil each other’s nerves ... "

The official message of the Center for Public Relations (CSP) of the FSB of the Russian Federation sounded on the evening of June 25, 2000 like "thunder in the blue." “As a result of a complex of operational measures, the Federal Security Service identified and exposed an agent of the American (CIA) and Lithuanian (DGB) special services.”

The message of the TsOS FSB in its form is more reminiscent of memorandums from the times of the Cold War. It declared in detail the goals and objectives that the Americans set for the "paid agent of the State Security Service", as well as all the committed and planned crimes. As follows from the text of the statement, the agent “has been involved since the beginning of 1999 in a special operation developed by the CIA to infiltrate the computer and information security units of the FSB of Russia in order to collect information about the organization of the work of these units, personnel, the level of professionalism of employees, as well as the possibility of countering these units to carry out Western intelligence operations against Russia.

On the eve of the US President's visit to Russia, the agent had the task of "bringing an FSB officer to Poland, where he could be recruited or caught red-handed." These actions were prevented, and, as the statement says, “thus, the plans of the CIA aimed at organizing a political provocation against Russia were thwarted.”

A few days later, the Lithuanian authorities made retaliatory statements.

On the morning of June 28, 2000, Speaker of the Seimas Vytautas Landsbergis, speaking on the radio, stated that the information about the exposure of the Lithuanian citizen was a lie. According to the speaker, at first the FSB officers portrayed Pavel Ilyin as a "terrible bandit" who "breaks into some centers and computers", and then "reported that he had been released." Summing up, the politician said: "This is a ball that burst as soon as it was launched."

A speech by the Deputy Director General of the Lithuanian State Security Department Arvydas Pocius soon followed. He told reporters that the Lithuanian citizen detained in Moscow is known to the State Security Department, as he advised certain employees of the department on computer issues. According to the deputy chief of Lithuanian intelligence, it was precisely in connection with this that the Russian FSB tried to recruit him, although citizen Pavel Ilyin “was not and is not a full-time and non-staff employee of the DGB.” In addition, Lithuanian intelligence officers deny the very fact of the detention of Pavel Ilyin in Moscow. According to them, he "had contact with FSB officers in Kaliningrad while drinking alcoholic beverages, where an attempt was made to recruit" .

According to Russian counterintelligence officers, further futility forced them to stop playing with Pavel Ilyin. Most likely, the CIA, which actually controlled the operation from the Lithuanian side, realized that the FSB was playing and decided to take tough measures. It was about a possible provocation against an FSB officer in a third country, where Pavel Ilyin called him for further meetings. It was categorically only about Poland, and the Student demanded a meeting with a young Russian hacker working for the FSB - as if his mirror counterpart. Representatives of the FSB claim that it was this danger that served as the main reason for curtailing the operation - experts have already had questions about why the FSB did not continue to play with Ilyin, using him as a channel of disinformation. On the other hand, Pavel Ilyin was mentally prepared for the fact that his career as an operative after the capture of a Russian citizen in Poland would be destroyed.

From the transcript of a conversation with Pavel Ilyin in Kaliningrad: “... the capture of an employee was planned in Poland. I didn't want detention... It will have to be carried out by the forces of a third country. And I had to deny everything, then repent, tearfully so ... ”CIA representatives in Lithuania practically did not hide the fact that it was they who were really in charge of the operation with Ilyin, which was calculated for 6-8 years. During the same conversation in Kaliningrad, Pavel Ilyin said: “No one has ever explicitly said the word “Americans”, there is an independent republic, tra-la-la and so on; when drunk, they can say “owners”, no more ... And the owners are very pleased that everything is going smoothly.”

Characteristically, the representatives of the CIA showed complete indifference to the failure of Ilyin, practically leaving the Lithuanian intelligence alone with their failure. However, the FSB quite confidently asserted that American intelligence officers were directly involved in the operation, without, however, naming names. It is possible that it is the presence of a "reserve" in the form of specific names of American citizens that keeps Langley from the usual violent reaction in such cases. The British SIS finds itself in a similar position, which the FSB does not directly blame. But Pavel Ilyin confirmed that the counterintelligence department of the DGB had recently moved to the building at 4-a Antakalne Street - across the wall from the British embassy. “They visit all the time. The British to these, these to the British ... Something like for tea.

Why was all the attention focused specifically on the CIA, and not MI6 or the DGB? It is possible that one of the reasons is the meeting of the leaders of the Russian Federation and the United States. Recall that the Americans were preparing a provocation in Poland. And what prevented domestic Chekists from implementing a similar operation?

Another reason is to be found in the realm of politics. This step of the FSB is a kind of reciprocal gesture of gratitude to the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus, who refused to sign the draft law proposed by the Lithuanian Seimas demanding compensation from Russia for the Soviet occupation of Lithuania.

The agent himself had to justify himself and prove that the insidious Chekists were to blame for everything. He appeared on Lithuanian national television on the evening of June 30, 2000, where he presented his version of what happened. Two of the largest and most influential Lithuanian newspapers published comments citing journalists' sources in the DGB. On the fifth day after the FSB announced the results of the operation in Kaliningrad, the DGB presented its relatively complete picture of what was happening.

However, as it turned out upon closer examination, the haste and, apparently, confusion let the DGB down. Pavel Ilyin claims that he came to Kaliningrad to buy real estate (with what money could a student who worked part-time in a tiny position in the province buy real estate in Russia?). At a birthday celebration, FSB officers allegedly made him drunk with cognac and tried to recruit him. But Ilyin's birthday is May 2, and the "conversation" in Kaliningrad took place on May 30. And what kind of idea is this - to go to Kaliningrad in order to celebrate a birthday almost a month late in the company of counterintelligence officers of a neighboring state? The confusion was also caused by an informational error - due to a technical accident, the announcer of one of the Russian TV channels, which was the first to publish information from the FSB, "expanded and supplemented" the text of the press release. As a result, the Student was "detained in Moscow".

The story of Pavel Ilyin did not end there. Late in the evening of June 25, 2000, the Student decided to urgently leave for Poland. When crossing the border, Lithuanian customs officers confiscated his computer disks containing secret documents. According to Student, quoted by the local newspaper Respublika, the discs contain evidence that Lithuania is carrying out reconnaissance against Russia. And a few days before that, he made a statement that, on the order of the State Security Service, he hacked the computer databases of the FSB.

This text is an introductory piece. From the book 100 great mysteries of nature author Nepomniachtchi Nikolai Nikolaevich

BALTIC GEYSERS An unusual phenomenon has been observed by geographers of the Kaliningrad State University over the past few years. First in one, then in another area of ​​the region, they record an anomalous increase in the temperature of underground water. Learn about it mainly from

From the book All Countries of the World author Varlamova Tatyana Konstantinovna

Lithuania Republic of Lithuania Date of establishment of an independent state: March 11, 1990 Area: 65.2 thousand square meters km Administrative divisions: 10 counties, 44 districts Capital: Vilnius Official language: Lithuanian Currency: litas Population: 3.4 million (2003) Population density

From the book Philatelic Geography. Soviet Union. the author From the book Great Soviet Encyclopedia (SO) the author TSB

From the book Abroad author Chuprinin Sergey Ivanovich

LITHUANIA According to the latest population census, about 3.5 million people live in Lithuania, one of the most mono-ethnic states in Europe, among which Russians make up only (according to various sources) from 6 to 8%. And almost all of them are full-fledged citizens of Lithuania, since, in

From the book Europe at the Turn of the 20th-21st Centuries: Economic Problems author Chernikov Gennady Petrovich

From the book Cheat Sheet on Organization Theory author Efimova Svetlana Alexandrovna

From the book Naval armaments of the Baltic countries author Panteleev Yu.

LITHUANIA THE ARMED FORCES of Lithuania consist of the ground forces of all branches of the armed forces with a total strength of up to 13,000 people. In wartime, the army can be brought up to 300,000 people. The country does not have a fleet, except for one patrol ship of 500 tons. The actual service life in the army is 12

The study of military history, military affairs is one of the ways to touch the general history. The history of the Lithuanian armed forces, as well as world military history, is very informative. Perhaps, for this, the Lithuanians should be grateful to their ancestors, who, from the very moment the tribes appeared, did not give rest to either each other or their neighbors. Robberies, battles, wars were almost the way of their life. Of course, if we fast forward to the present times and consider the latest period, we will be convinced that in modern Lithuania, military science and military history are already on a completely different level. The Lithuanian army, having gone through a very long and difficult path of development, has become modern, equivalent to the armed forces of other countries. One of the attributes of the army, following the requirements of modernity, is the emergence of special forces.

What path did the Lithuanian Special Forces go through to reach the current level and earn the recognition of foreign partners?

Special operations and the units of the armed forces that carry them out are attracting more and more attention from both the military and the public. Since the world practice of such units is still quite new, I assume that the interest in this topic is beyond doubt. The relevance of the topic is also quite justified. It suffices to turn to the events of 2001, when international terrorism demonstrated its strength with unprecedented clarity and cruelty. In the war against this threat, special forces were needed. On the scale of Lithuania, the changes and reorganization carried out in the Special Forces over the past 4 years cannot go unnoticed. It is worth bearing in mind that even greater transformations in these troops are planned in the near future. As a result of such reforms, Lithuania can become one of the leaders in the separation of special forces and their adaptation to the role of separate units against the backdrop of a common armed forces.

Prerequisites for the emergence of special forces
World background

In the twentieth century, with the growing threat of terrorism in the world, the armed forces of different countries began to look for ways to deal with this outwardly invisible and difficult to predict enemy. For this purpose, non-conventional army units were created, recognized to carry out special operations. To effectively combat illegal terrorist groups, such units must be small and flexible, able to act particularly quickly and unconventionally in a changing situation. To gain time, special units must be guided by simpler planning and operating procedures than a conventional conventional army.

Army units capable of performing special combat missions performed different tasks in different periods of history.

Prior to the First World War, such units were considered elite units of light cavalry, performing reconnaissance raids and quick attacks behind enemy lines. When the war moved to the positional stage, the status of special forces was awarded to the assault and trench combat teams, which specialized in unexpected occupation and suppression of the most dangerous enemy firing points.

During the Second World War, reconnaissance and sabotage units of tactical and operational purposes, and mobile assault units can be considered representatives of the special forces. At this time, a more massive use of sea and air assault begins. At that time, such units were formed more on an experimental basis than on the model of statutory army units. The functioning of such units was largely based on adventurism. The operations performed had a particularly high degree of risk. Often the military leadership formally did not want to control the course of a military operation. The responsibility for its result rested with the commander of the special unit himself.

Exercises before leaving for Afghanistan

With the development of the Cold War, many quantitatively and qualitatively created military units arose. The strike units remained, but the niche of special operations began to be occupied by completely different trained units. Their specialization was long-term autonomous activity in a low-intensity conflict zone or behind enemy lines. From the end of World War II until the 70s, this area of ​​​​activity (modern special forces) gradually became the most in demand (British Special Air Service SAS, American Green Beret operations in Southeast Asia). Purely offensive operations by such units were relatively rare. Contact with the enemy was due only to the inevitability of the situation. A lot of experience was accumulated in small units, counterguerrilla operations. In the event of a global military conflict, non-conventional actions performed by special forces were to be transferred to the deep rear of the enemy. In this case, special attention should have been paid to the decommissioning of civilian and military strategic facilities.

Standard of the Special Operations Forces

Since the 70s of the twentieth century, another area of ​​​​activity of special forces began to stand out - short-term active and aggressive direct actions. I had to fight not only in the jungle and in the countries of the "third world", but also against the "urban guerrillas". Criminal and political terrorism came to Europe and the USA, and it was necessary to take measures against it. Increased attention has been given to units that specialize in such measures. This was caused by the first wave of terrorism from the radical left and small pro-Islamist groups, which caused many casualties.

Special anti-terrorist groups improved on the battlefield. By the early 1990s, these units had already accumulated invaluable experience. The British are considered the most experienced in the field of special operations, namely their special forces SAS. These troops are trained in a wide range of special operations.

The organizational structure of the US ground forces is more focused on certain specialized areas, such as rangers - an assault unit; "Green Berets" - a special operations group designed for operations in the deep rear; "Delta" - special purpose anti-terrorist unit; "Navy seals" of the Navy - a unit of combat swimmers. However, in the 80s, practice showed that the activities of these troops were not properly coordinated. In 1984, the United States created the operational leadership of special forces, coordinating plans for special operations.

The emergence of special forces is associated with the desire to oppose the human factor of industrialization and the military industry. At the new stage of warfare, it is not large weapons that pose an increasing danger, but an arsenal of small and diverse weapons. Now a disproportionately large blow can be delivered not by classical troops, but by structures in which political, criminal, religious and military components are intertwined. This makes modern special forces improve at a qualitative level. Even more important at this stage is the connection of such units, that is, complex-collective activity. In modern operations, activities and tasks are performed simultaneously at multiple levels.

Emergence of Lithuanian Special Forces

The beginning of the special forces of Lithuania was laid by the current Jaeger battalion named after Vytautas the Great. This battalion began to form in 1991.

The history of the development and consolidation of our special forces is similar to the general evolution of troops of this kind. Having emerged as assault units, they have turned into professional, well-equipped units capable of performing not only highly specialized, but also complex tasks.

Nevertheless, 1995 is officially considered the emergence of Lithuanian special forces, when it was decided to create a professional counter-terrorism unit. The Special Purpose Department under the Volunteer Service for the Protection of the Territory (DSOK) was a unit created on the basis of volunteer service. Later, only the name of this department changed, which became known as the Special Purpose Service (SON).

A turning point in the development of the Lithuanian special forces occurred after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in the United States. All special forces (commandos of the Chasseur battalion, SON fighters, combat swimmers of the Underwater Action Command (KPD), the Air Force helicopter unit), which had previously operated separately, were united into the Aitvaras formation. The first test of this connection was Operation Durable Peace, which began in Afghanistan in 2002. In the course of carrying out joint actions, the squadron coped with the assigned tasks very well and was rated excellently by the military leadership of foreign partners. At that time, this squadron was not yet permanent, its mobilization took place only by order of the military commander. The last point in the process of unification of the special forces was set in January 2004, when the permanent special task force "Aitvaras" was established. It should be emphasized that this became precisely a permanent connection, for the command of which a separate state was established.

The use of special forces

In cases where peaceful means have been exhausted, and the conflict takes place outside the country, or citizens of a foreign state are involved in it, and the use of precisely targeted and unexpected armed force is necessary, the leadership of the state and the army command sets a task for the military special forces. According to international standards, elite military units are designed to perform short-term, especially complex, locally defined and specific tasks. In peacetime, this can be the release of Lithuanian citizens taken hostage in another country, the evacuation of embassy employees and citizens of our country from zones covered by armed conflict, the detention of war criminals as part of the implementation of international agreements or assignments, other special operations abroad, security representatives of higher foreign ranks within their country. In the event of a military conflict, the task is to destroy enemy strategic facilities, organize ambushes, protect individuals, and conduct reconnaissance and sabotage operations.

Units of the special purpose unit "Aitvaras"
Connection Headquarters

In the Lithuanian armed forces, military units have existed for quite a long time, on the basis of which, after the terrorist attack in the United States on September 11, 2001, it was decided to form the Aitvaras special operations unit (hereinafter referred to as MTR), designed to perform special tasks, including anti-terrorist ones. Beginning in 2002, the Special Forces Service, Jaeger Battalion Commandos, Navy Combat Swimmers and the Air Force Special Operations Helicopter Unit, until then performing their functions separately from each other, began to organize themselves into a flexible or mobile, but non-permanent unit, assembled by order of the commander of the army to perform special tasks of an unconventional nature.

In 2004, the MTR Headquarters was created, to which the SOF and the Jaeger Battalion were directly subordinate, and the Navy Underwater Command and the Air Force Special Operational Helicopter Unit were transferred to operational subordination. The creation of the headquarters was carried out in order to more effectively manage and coordinate the activities of the compound. Its structure does not differ from the classical headquarters. The only difference is that here the procedures take a little less time. Servicemen from the SON, Jaeger battalion served at the headquarters, an opportunity was created to serve as servicemen of the Navy's underwater operations team and the Air Force's Special Operational Helicopter Unit. The main task of the MTR Headquarters is to ensure that the different parts of the formation function effectively and complement each other, rationally using their specialized functions.

Symbols of the headquarters of the MTR

Insignia and awards

The special-purpose unit began to be called "Aitvaras" not by chance. Lithuanians often associate military affairs with a romanticized view of the times of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Lithuanian folklore (in legends, tales, legends) reflects the firmness, determination, strength of the Lithuanian warrior, justice and devotion to one's country. Aitvaras is a mythological creature, a flying fiery spirit, the guardian of the elements. One of the reasons for choosing such a name is related to those mythological properties of Aitvaras, which are associated with his mystery and secrecy, which is closely related to the halo surrounding the special forces. Often the appearance of Aitvaras is described as rarely and unexpectedly shown to people, a fiery poker with a sparkling tail flying in the crowns of trees.

In the myths, Aitvaras helps good people and punishes bad ones. Consequently, Atvaras is also considered as a symbol of justice.

Aitvaras in the form of a fiery medieval Lithuanian sword is depicted on the patch of the Special Operations Unit "Aitvaras".

Jaeger Battalion. Vytautas the Great

The training unit (Kaunas company) - a jaeger battalion, was born in 1991, when a company of the Voluntary Regional Guard Service (DSOK) was established in Kaunas. On December 3, 1991, the Kaunas Rapid Reaction Battalion was officially established, which in 1992 became the Kaunas Motorized Landing Battalion of the Gelezinis Vilkas (Iron Wolf) Brigade. On October 22, 1993, the Kaunas Motorized Landing Battalion was named after the Third Infantry Regiment. Vytautas the Great and the regimental motto "To you, Fatherland - our strength and life" was adopted.

However, the real history of the rangers begins in 1995, when the battalion began to report not to the brigade, but to the commander of the army, and it was named after the Jaeger battalion named after. Vytautas the Great. For the training of the military personnel of the battalion, the US special forces program began to be used. The structure of the battalion began to meet such requirements. Until that moment, the battalion performed infantry tasks, but after the changes in the structure of the battalion, the team using small unit tactics became the largest active unit. At the same time, preparations began for reconnaissance and sabotage missions. When recruiting for Alpha Company, which consisted exclusively of professionals, specific requirements were presented.

In January 2004, the Jaeger Battalion. Vytautas the Great became an integral part of the Aitvaras Special Operations Unit. The training of professional military under the commando program was introduced. With the entry of the battalion into the MTR, the following tasks were assigned to it: special reconnaissance and surveillance; analysis and assessment of the combat situation; transfer of information to other units of special forces; military aid; support of SOF units during anti-terrorist operations.

Selection. After the reorganization, new servicemen who wanted to get into the battalion were required to pass a general selection in the MTR. Only professional military personnel could participate. After the selection, special basic training of the reconnaissance officer, specialized training (scuba diving, parachuting, descending from buildings and from a helicopter), and lessons in the tactics of small units began to be carried out. The battalion personnel were divided into 4 specialized teams according to the structure of the combat squadron: free-fall paratroopers, a water operations team, heavy weapons teams and a combat team in winter conditions or in the mountains. Battalion fighters also began to be trained in traditional military specialties: grenade launcher, machine gunner, signalman. Much attention was paid to the training of snipers. Thanks to the extreme conditions of training and selfless work, the huntsmen have become elite soldiers.

Armament. The main vehicle is specially made Land Rover Defender all-terrain vehicles, the weapons are reinforced (automatic grenade launchers, mortars adapted to support the intervention). For operations on the water, commando combat boats began to be used, and for operations from the air and transportation, special operations helicopters and parachutes began to be used. The huntsmen were equipped with special means of communication, surveillance equipment, satellite communication radio stations, computer equipment, targeting equipment, and a global positioning system (GPS).

Traditions of the Jaeger Battalion. Vytautas the Great

The word "huntsman" in German means "hunter, shooter." In the 18-19 centuries. Chasseurs, along with line infantrymen and grenadiers, were part of the infantry military units. For the first time huntsmen are mentioned during the 30th war (1618-1648). In the army of the Principality of Brandenburg, the best shooters of each company were called chasseurs. Jaegers were special teams of shooters. They were staffed with foresters and their children, as well as well-aimed warriors. Jaegers were required to navigate well in the forest, to shoot accurately. In 1775, after the military reform in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the former banner (company) of the Janissaries was transformed into a company of rangers, subordinate to the Grand Hetman. The banner consisted of 87 soldiers. Uniform - green caftan (tunic), bright red cuffs, white waistcoat and culottes, golden epaulettes. For the battalion, the name of rangers is a kind of sign of historical continuity.

A special tradition of the Jaeger Battalion is the awarding of the title of Honorary Jaeger. Only the best huntsmen can earn this name. The title and the right to wear the "Honorary Jaeger" patch could be received by any fighter, regardless of appointment or transfer to the reserve. The "Huntsman" patch, in yellow letters on a green background, is intended for daily uniforms, and in silver letters on a khaki background, for field uniforms.

Another tradition of the battalion since 1997 is the presentation of an officer's jaeger dagger. The metal part of the handle of this dagger is made in the form of a stylized falcon's head.

Beret cockade

It depicts a falcon, a hunting horn, a dagger and lightning. Metal-colored falcon and horn, silver-colored dagger with black lacquer handle, yellow lacquer lightning bolt, green background of the cockade. The hunting horn (bugle) symbolizes the subordination of fighters and units, the falcon - vigilance and speed, as well as the readiness to attack the enemy from the air. The steel dagger symbolizes the hardness of the huntsman, and the lightning symbolizes a lightning-fast reaction to the actions of the enemy.

Service emblem

The blue cape symbolizes the continuity in the battalion of the traditions of the troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Against the background of the cape on the red shield are the heraldic signs of Vytautas the Great: in the upper part of the shield there is a Latin letter V, on the right - a crossed sword and a spearhead.

Special Purpose Service (SON)

The modern SON began to take shape as part of the Volunteer Territory Protection Service (DSOK). At that time, several officers were sent to the French Gendarmerie Counter-Terrorism Unit (GIGN) to gain experience. Upon their return to Lithuania, they were instructed, in confidentiality, to set up an anti-terrorism service within the FLLC, called the Reconnaissance Detachment. The informal formation of the service began in 1995. For about two years, volunteer military personnel created a selection and training program. On April 7, 1997, the Special Purpose Division of the DSOK was formally established.

Over time, the name of the service and subordination changed, and after a few years, given the emerging tasks and the need for expansion, the department was renamed the Service and became directly subordinate to the commander of the army. Since the inception of the Service, the members of the SOJ have acted as they describe themselves: "<…>we collected and analyzed information about the special forces of different countries, their structure, use, and looked for the most suitable option for Lithuania. At the same time, the selection of personnel was carried out, various exercises were carried out, preparations for the implementation of special tasks, the search for weapons and equipment that were most suitable for the soldiers of the Lithuanian special forces.

At the same time, intensive work was carried out, the fighters of the service carried out personal protection of the guests of the Ministry of Defense of the Territory and performed other tasks within the country. When Lithuania joined Operation Durable Peace in Afghanistan in 2002, the SON troops successfully fought for two years as part of the Aitvaras Expeditionary Squadron. The allies highly appreciated the level of training of the military and their ability to carry out special operations. When the Special Operations Unit was formed in 2004, the SON became an integral part of it.

Tasks. The Special Purpose Service is a counter-terrorist unit of the Lithuanian army, which performed special tasks and carried out special operations.

Military personnel who had served one year in the Jaeger Battalion, or, in exceptional cases, participated in international missions, could participate in the selection. The military personnel who passed the selection were sent for specialized training. Those wishing to become "green" had to go through several stages of selection and basic training. The fighters who passed the selection began to engage in a basic training program that took a total of about one year and included various courses, depending on the specialization. The applicant could not get into the combat team until all these stages were completed.

Armament. In addition to standard weapons, SOF fighters used tools more adapted to the conduct of counter-terrorist operations. They were provided with uniforms designed for close combat, special impenetrable vests, shields, helmets with visors, searchlights. Depending on the task, sniper weapons of various calibers could be chosen - German, Finnish production, etc. And among light weapons, MP-5N submachine guns (marine version), MP-5AD - with a silencer were used; gas grenades for various purposes and various capacities. The SON arsenal included various grenade launchers, machine guns, automatic rifles, day and night sights. Weapons and ammunition were selected to best suit the conditions of the operation (eg non-ricochet ammunition for indoor operations). The SON fighters have proven themselves well and have accumulated considerable experience in testing the latest weapons.

Traditions of the Special Forces. "Greens"

A SON service fighter is called "green". This name was not chosen by chance. It is connected with an appeal to the history of Lithuania and drawing parallels with the armed resistance fighters of the Soviet government in 1944-53. The current "greens" have kept in mind the post-war freedom fighters, not only in name. The organization, discipline, determination and self-sacrifice of the post-war resistance fighters have become excellent examples and motivation for modern "greens" who seek to continue the valiant traditions.

Military salute in memory of the soldiers of the post-war period

The name "green" has been officially used since 1996, as a tribute to the anti-Soviet resistance that lasted more than 10 years. This name contains the idea of ​​determination to find a way to act under the most unfavorable circumstances, resolutely striving for the outlined goal.

Not all SON fighters have gone green. Only those who had a stripe that testified to the highest military qualifications, impeccable training, psychological stability and moral stability were named so. Belonging to the "green" - the highest mark of a fighter SON, assigned only after a long selection and intensive specialized training. When handing over the patch, the commander uttered a word that had a deep meaning: "do not let you down." This meant that the soldier must constantly feel responsible to his land, family, comrades and justify the trust of the state and the military command. SON also acquired its own emblem, which depicts arrows, meaning long-range combat (sniper operations), a grenadier symbol - a grenade, symbolizing the use of explosives during operations, as well as a sword - a symbol of close combat (knives, pistols).

Underwater Action Command (KPD)

The beginning of the Underwater Action Command (KPD) was laid in 1990. With the arrival of professional divers in the Volunteer Territory Protection Service (VSS), their efforts began the creation of a training program for new swimmers, literature, diving equipment and equipment accumulated. In 1992, these divers were transferred to the Diving Team of the Reconnaissance Detachment of the Klaipeda Battalion (modern Dragoon Battalion) of the "Geležinis Vilkas" (Iron Wolf) Brigade. At that time, a training program for military divers was being created, important tasks were being carried out: demining, searching for explosives. In 1996, the Reconnaissance Detachment was renamed the Combat Swimmer Detachment. In 2001, military divers became part of the Navy and became known as the Underwater Action Command (KPD).

In 1996, cooperation with the Special Purpose Service began, and the exchange of experience in performing tasks on the water began. Soon, the selection of combat swimmers was organized on the basis of SON. The military personnel who passed the selection were sent to serve in the KPD, where their training continued. After the events of September 11, 2001, the United States began the creation of a Special Operations Unit, which was to include the CPD. Thus, the KPD, together with the fighters of Aitvaras, began to prepare for anti-terrorist operations. Somewhat later, at the operational level, the KPD became subordinate to the commander of the SOF.

KPD tasks: team members are trained to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage operations, protect water bodies from enemy sabotage, conduct land reconnaissance with disembarkation from the water, underwater demining, inspection of ships. Thus, combat divers were trained to perform special operations both in water and on land.

The selection of combat divers for the unit was carried out in several stages. First of all, candidates had to pass the general selection in the MTR. After that, the basic training of military divers began. The fighters who graduated from this course were waiting for specialization: the opportunity to become a ship diver, an underwater demining specialist or a combat swimmer.

Armament. For operations on the water (associated with special reconnaissance, mining and demining of dangerous objects), combat swimmers used closed and open cycle diving apparatus, wet and dry type suits, fins, underwater orientation equipment, powerful boarding boats, waterproof weapons and radio communications. The main weapons of divers adapted for carrying under water are combat knives, Heckler & Koch MP-5N submachine guns (marine version).

Special Operations Unit (SOP)

Military helicopter pilots began to carry out reconnaissance operations together with rangers since 1995. The specialization of helicopter pilots in the field of special operations has been introduced since 1997 in cooperation with the fighters of the special forces department of the Volunteer Guards of the Territory (VOK). Until 2003, the Special Operations Unit of the Helicopter Squadron was formed, to which helicopters and pilots were assigned.

The purpose of the PPS is to ensure mobility, efficiency and surprise in the performance of tasks. The functions of the link are reconnaissance from the air, the transportation of SON fighters, air support.

Selection. When performing special operations, the helicopter team consisted of a commander, an on-board technician and a machine gunner (in accordance with the specifics of the task).

Technique and weapons. The special operations unit used the Mi-8 and Mi-8 MTV helicopters operated by the Lithuanian Air Force. Helicopters used in special operations did not have night vision devices, the communication system was imperfect. Mi-8 helicopters were armed with aircraft missiles designed to destroy ground targets. Machine guns were mounted on both sides of the helicopter, and high-speed six-barreled machine guns could also be mounted.

Unwritten rules of special forces

Lithuanian special forces, like their counterparts in other countries, have their own code of honor. Fighters are guided by unwritten but important rules. The Lithuanian special forces are trying to combine two often contradictory principles: freedom and discipline. A fighter must be proactive, have inner freedom and independence of thought, and at the same time be able to obey and respect both higher and lower ranks. In all parts of the special purpose, the tradition of "baptism", a kind of initiation, which, of course, is kept secret, has spread. The principle of honor for the fighters of the Connection was the statement: "if at least one fighter is in the ranks, then the unit is alive and will fight to the end."

Special forces in international missions

Since 1994, the fighters of the Jaeger Battalion have been constantly taking part in peacekeeping missions in Croatia and Kosovo, and since 2002, in Operation Durable Peace in Afghanistan. The mission in Kosovo and the mission in Afghanistan differed significantly in their nature and tasks. In Kosovo, the huntsmen did not have the opportunity to test their strength as special forces soldiers. Our commandos passed their baptism of fire in Afghanistan, performing their mission as part of the Aitvaras squadron, along with the "green" and combat swimmers. Such interaction of fighters guaranteed the success and effectiveness of the Afghan mission. In this mission, especially modern weapons and equipment were used, which in Kosovo could only dream of.

The composition of the Aitvaras squadrons heading to Afghanistan was different. The first two squadrons included the "greens" from the SON and the huntsmen, and the third mostly consisted of the "greens" and the combat swimmers of the KPD. During the first mission, which lasted 6 months, the fighters of the squadron carried out mainly combat reconnaissance, although there were also direct actions. The third squadron carried out much more intensive operations, of which only a smaller part was special intelligence, and everything else was direct action (when the specific goal and task are known; the operation is unexpected and quick, designed to detain or neutralize the intended object). The information collected by the Lithuanians during special intelligence operations mainly concerned terrorist groups and their commanders.

Armament of special operational troops

Different weapons were used for different tasks. We tried to buy what is modern and optimally corresponds to the price. Compared to similar parts of other countries, Lithuanian fighters used adequate weapons. They tried to abandon the old weapons that the entire army used to use, for example, the Soviet Kalashnikovs, to use them only during exercises, and use new samples adapted for special operations as the main weapon. The main thing is that the weapon is accurate and reliable.

MTR soldiers began to use Glock-17 pistols, Heckler & Koch MP-5 submachine guns (with and without a silencer), Browning machine guns, Karl Gustav anti-tank grenade launchers, 60-mm mortars, disposable and underbarrel grenade launchers, modern German G-36 automatic rifles (various modifications), Sako and Gol Sniper sniper rifles, rangefinders, holographic sights, European-made night vision devices that meet the requirements of special operations officers, radio communications (Harris radio stations) that can be used to conduct negotiations both in the air and on the ground, over unlimited distances and in various natural conditions. To overcome obstacles, the use of climbing equipment has begun.

The fighters adapted the equipment and ammunition for themselves in the way that was convenient for them. It was easy to change the configuration of the tactical vest, as it is more flexible and made taking into account the wishes of the fighters. It was possible to place grenades, shops, radio communications, first-aid kits, and flasks on it in various ways. True, the MTR fighters did not use flasks familiar to our infantrymen, but “camel humps” (English camel back), which were attached to their backs, and water was supplied through a special tube. An integral part of the equipment of the MTR fighters is bulletproof Kevlar helmets (they could have been with a special wide visor to help protect themselves from shots), as well as bulletproof vests (in exceptional cases, vests of the highest 4 degree of protection were used, corresponding to 7.62 mm shot from AK). The fighters could not do without such special means as grenades (sound and light), explosives (in order to provide a passage, for example, to destroy a wall - but not to destroy the people inside), gases - intoxicating, disorienting, but not destroying impact.

See also Spetsnaz.org: